Somalia’s push to operationalize a National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) has ignited a debate that reaches far beyond technical administration. At stake are core questions about the Provisional Constitution, the balance of power between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS), and the real-world consequences of layering a new federal ID on top of existing systems, including the country’s internationally recognized biometric passport. The outcome will shape citizen trust, intergovernmental relations, and the credibility of state-building in a fragile federation.
Constitutional Fault Lines
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Somalia’s federal design rests on clear divisions of authority. Articles 48 and 54 of the Provisional Constitution signal that powers not expressly assigned to the center reside with the states. Identity registration is not listed among the federal executive’s exclusive mandates. Instead, it sits at the intersection of civil registration, citizenship verification, and local governance—domains that, in practice, have been managed largely at the state level.
That constitutional context complicates any unilateral federal move to construct a new ID regime. Legal scholars and FMS officials argue the FGS risks overstepping its remit by creating NIRA without explicit delegation or negotiated agreement. The issue is not simply technical; it tests constitutional discipline and federal balance. In a federation still consolidating its institutions, the perception of central encroachment can erode the trust required to make shared systems work.
There are also concerns about legislative procedure. In a bicameral structure designed to protect state interests, the Upper House plays a critical role in vetting federal laws that touch state functions. Questions about whether the NIRA framework received the level of bicameral scrutiny envisaged by the Constitution add to worries about its legal soundness and staying power.
Process and the Missing Consultation
The Provisional Constitution emphasizes cooperation and consultation as pillars of federal governance (Article 50). By many accounts, NIRA’s rollout has been perceived as top-down, with Federal Member States given limited opportunity to shape design, governance, or implementation. This matters: identification systems touch security vetting, service delivery, civil registries, and—in states conducting local polls—election administration.
In a low-trust political environment, the optics of centralization can harden positions. When reforms affecting state competencies proceed without visible co-design, they risk becoming flashpoints rather than unifying national projects. For NIRA, the lack of a broadly owned roadmap threatens to turn a potentially useful modernization effort into a source of intergovernmental strain.
Practical Duplication in a Three-Layer System
Somalia already maintains an internationally recognized biometric passport containing biographic data, biometric identifiers, and nationality verification—features that meet global identity standards. Across the FMS, state-level civil registration and ID systems are operating, serving daily needs such as employment verification, mobility, access to services, and, in some jurisdictions, electoral registration. These systems have the benefit of proximity and community trust.
Creating a separate federal ID risks layering a third identification instrument on top of the passport and state IDs. Without harmonization, the result is fragmentation that undermines efficiency and confuses citizens. A three-layer identity architecture invites:
- Conflicting or siloed databases
- Inconsistent verification standards across jurisdictions
- Administrative overlap and wasted public resources
- Duplicate enrollment and documentation burdens for citizens
- Uncertainty over which ID governs access to services or legal status
Identity systems are not neutral infrastructure. They decide who is seen by the state, who receives services and humanitarian aid, who pays taxes, and who is eligible to vote or move freely. In Somalia’s contested political landscape, adding an uncoordinated federal layer to sensitive personal and biometric data raises red flags about control, access, and misuse.
Legitimacy, Data Protection, and the Risk of Politicization
Trust is the lifeblood of identification systems. Where people doubt that their data is secure—or fear it could be used for political ends—enrollment falters and compliance suffers. Critics worry that a centrally administered NIRA, absent robust safeguards, could be politicized or applied unevenly across regions. Data protection laws and independent oversight are not window dressing; they are prerequisites for legitimacy.
International experience in federations points toward cooperative or hybrid models that align national identification imperatives with subnational institutions. Rather than supplanting state civil registries, successful systems often federate them—setting nationwide standards and interoperability protocols while preserving state roles in registration and service delivery. That approach fits Somalia’s constitutional design better than a unitary model presented as a fait accompli.
A Constitutional Path Forward
If NIRA is to endure and deliver value, its legal basis, governance model, and operations must reflect the Constitution and the realities of federal politics. A pragmatic, sequenced approach would emphasize integration over replacement and partnership over imposition. Key steps include:
- Structured federal–state dialogue: Convene a formal intergovernmental forum to delineate roles and responsibilities, including data stewardship, enrollment protocols, dispute resolution, and funding.
- Legislative review and alignment: Ensure any NIRA framework passes bicameral scrutiny, with particular attention to the Upper House’s mandate to safeguard state interests.
- Harmonization, not duplication: Integrate the existing biometric passport and state IDs under a national interoperability standard—common data schemas, shared verification rails, and mutual recognition—rather than creating a third stand-alone credential.
- Data protection and oversight: Enact clear privacy laws, define lawful uses, require consent where appropriate, and install independent oversight with audit powers to prevent abuse and reassure the public.
- Phased, consultative implementation: Pilot in willing states, iterate policies jointly, publish transparency reports, and build capacity across all levels of government before nationwide scaling.
This blueprint recognizes state investments already made in civil registration and preserves the authority and proximity that make those systems effective. It also positions the federal government to set standards, ensure interoperability, and meet international requirements without centralizing sensitive databases in ways that exacerbate political tensions.
The Bottom Line
Modern, secure identification is a legitimate national goal. But the route matters as much as the destination. Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, the existence of an internationally recognized biometric passport, and the widespread use of state-level IDs argue for a federated solution anchored in consultation and law. A unilateral federal ID risks duplication, legal contestation, and citizen confusion—outcomes that weaken, rather than strengthen, state capacity.
The durable path is constitutional clarity, shared ownership, and technical integration. If NIRA evolves into a cooperative framework that harmonizes existing systems, respects state prerogatives, and protects citizen data, it can enhance service delivery, security, and electoral integrity. If it proceeds as a stand-alone, centrally imposed scheme, it will likely encounter resistance, waste resources, and struggle for public legitimacy. The choice now facing policymakers is not whether Somalia needs strong identification infrastructure, but whether that infrastructure will be built in a way that strengthens the federation it serves.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
