Puntland State’s “victory” over ISIS-Somalia is tentative — and raises hard questions about what comes next
BOSASO, Somalia — After nearly a year of focused operations in the Cal‑Miskaat highlands and the rugged valleys of Bari, Puntland State’s regional president declared this week that Islamic State–Somalia had been broken as a fighting force. Said Abdullahi Deni told members of the regional parliament that the campaign, launched in December 2024 with support from the United States and regional partners, had “destroyed all IS‑Somalia capabilities,” leaving only a scattering of fugitives in the Baallade Valley.
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The assertion — and the public display of progress that accompanied it — provides an important marker for a campaign that has been dominated by aerial strikes and fast‑moving local offensives. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has acknowledged providing months of aerial support and local officials say caves in the Baallade Valley were hit hard this week. Puntland State forces reported dozens of militants killed during the 11‑month operation, and earlier clashes in the Humbulo area left at least seven militants and three government soldiers dead.
Victory claimed, war still being fought
Yet on the ground, the story is more complicated. Residents and local security sources describe continuing clashes, hit‑and‑run attacks, and a small but persistent network of militants who are switching to guerrilla tactics — slipping between caves, valleys and sparsely populated highlands.
“They are not finished,” said a resident of Baallade who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Some fled into the hills. Others move at night.” That kind of persistent, low‑intensity threat has defined counterinsurgency campaigns from Afghanistan to northeastern Nigeria, where air power and short offensives can clear terrain temporarily but rarely neutralize an ideologically driven insurgency without sustained governance and local buy‑in.
Deni’s claim that militant numbers had once exceeded 2,000 fighters — “mostly foreigners,” he told MPs — underscores another challenge: the presence of transnational militants complicates local solutions. Foreign fighters can bring specialized knowledge and the will to fight on, but they can also be easier to deter or deport than local recruits who live among communities and draw on social networks to survive.
Air power, partners and the new map of counterterrorism
The role of AFRICOM and the publicly acknowledged support from the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Kenya point to a broader trend across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa: an increasing reliance on partnerships and remote firepower rather than large foreign troop deployments. The strategy has political appeal — it avoids the diplomatic and fiscal costs of long‑term occupation — but it brings its own risks.
- Airstrikes can disrupt and degrade militant structures, but without a parallel push to restore local services and security, cleared areas can become contested again.
- External support can bolster regional forces, but it can also deepen local perceptions that fighting is being outsourced to foreign powers, complicating efforts to build trust.
In Puntland State, where clan dynamics and the economic importance of the port city of Bosaso shape politics, the balance between security operations and governance will be decisive. Militants in the region have historically exploited weak institutions, poor economic prospects and local grievances to recruit, and clearing caves in a valley will not address those drivers overnight.
The human toll and the question of accountability
Beyond the military tally of militants killed, there is a quieter, less visible human cost. Displacement, disrupted livelihoods and the psychological toll on communities living in and around conflict zones rarely make headlines the way airstrikes or battlefield counts do. Local officials have urged residents to “participate actively” in rooting out the remaining militants, a call that can be read as encouragement for community vigilance but also risks stoking vengeance and vigilantism in fragile settings.
Accountability and reconciliation will be central to durable stability. How will Puntland State and the federal government handle captured fighters? Will there be processes to reintegrate low‑level militants who were conscripted or coerced? And how can the administration ensure that security gains are translated into improved services, jobs and a sense that the state is present and legitimate?
What comes next — and why it matters beyond Somalia
Puntland State’s offensive is part of a wider recalibration of counterterrorism in Africa. Western and Gulf actors increasingly prioritise enabling regional partners with intelligence, air support and training, while hoping to limit boots on the ground. That model can deliver tactical victories, but history warns that it does not always yield lasting strategic success.
If Puntland State’s declaration of victory is accurate and near‑term operations finish off remaining pockets of fighters, the region could see a respite that opens space for reconstruction and governance. If, however, militants remain able to melt back into the terrain, the cycle of clearance and return is likely to repeat — with the attendant human and political costs.
For the people of Bari and the communities who bore the brunt of the campaign, the most urgent questions are practical: When will displaced families return? Who will hold local security to account? And will the promises of external partners convert into sustained investment in infrastructure, education and jobs that make lives less vulnerable to militant recruitment?
In a world where the contours of counterterrorism are being redrawn, Puntland State’s campaign is a testing ground. It is a reminder that military force can shape outcomes on the ground, but that lasting peace hinges on politics, justice and the daily rhythms of life. As leaders celebrate battlefield gains, the true test will be whether those gains are converted into a stable, inclusive future for communities long marked by conflict.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
