Djibouti’s new troop deployment highlights a widening fault line in Somalia’s fragile stabilisation
Djibouti’s announcement that it will send additional troops to Somalia is a small but telling development in a long-running struggle that has consumed the Horn of Africa for more than a decade. The move — formalised in a new bilateral agreement with Mogadishu and presented at the United Nations by Djibouti’s envoy Mohamed Siad Doualeh — is aimed at bolstering the African Union-led stabilisation effort against the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab. But what looks like an apparently straightforward reinforcements decision reveals deeper regional tensions, chronic financing shortfalls and hard questions about who will shoulder the burden of peace in Somalia.
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Small state, outsized role
For a country of fewer than one million people, Djibouti has steadily carved out a strategic role on the continent. Its deep-water port and spotless security record have made it a favoured hub for global navies and logistics, while its capital hosts military facilities from the United States, France, China and others. Sending troops to Somalia is in line with that orientation: it is an expression of regional responsibility and a hedge against instability spilling across porous borders.
“We welcome the strides made in the stabilisation mission in Somalia, but much must be done to keep the country safe and secure,” Doualeh told UN colleagues, urging continued international support. The additional Djiboutian force, officials say, will reinforce frontline contingents and expand coverage in areas where Somali security institutions remain weak.
Regional politics complicate deployments
But troop numbers are only one part of the equation. The Horn’s geopolitical rivalries are increasingly shaping who goes where and when. Egypt, which has donated military equipment to the Somali National Army and signalled willingness to deploy personnel, faces objections in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia — a key Somali security partner and the region’s dominant military power — has been locked in a bitter dispute with Cairo over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. The dam dispute is primarily about water security, but it has spilled into other arenas of diplomacy and military cooperation.
That tension illustrates a wider problem: the patchwork of national interests among Somalia’s supposed patrons can do as much to hinder stabilisation as do the militants themselves. Contributions from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi and now Djibouti and potentially Egypt are valuable, but they arrive within an arena of strategic competition rather than a single, unified policy toward Somali state-building.
Money matters — and it’s running out
Even as new contingents arrive, the African Union’s stabilisation apparatus is under severe financial stress. The mission — struggling with a reported funding gap of about $180 million — cannot simply absorb fresh commitments without the cash to pay, equip and sustain troops. Troop rotations, logistics, medical support and local reconciliation programs all require predictable funding streams. When those dry up, the risk is that forces will be present in name but unable to operate effectively.
Donor fatigue is not confined to Somalia. Across Africa and beyond, crises have multiplied — from the wars in Ukraine and Gaza to climate-driven humanitarian emergencies — and governments and aid agencies face zero-sum choices. The result is that stabilisation operations in places like Somalia often rely on short-term pledges rather than enduring commitments, a recipe for starts and stops that insurgents can exploit.
What this means for Somalis
On the ground, the stakes are simple and stark. For civilians in central and southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab’s ability to fracture communities, impose brutal rule and disrupt markets and schools makes everyday life precarious. Military deployments can suppress terror cells and protect key towns, but true security depends on governance: functioning courts, reliable police, inclusive politics and economic opportunity.
Somalia’s federal institutions are fragile and still consolidating after decades of conflict. External troops can provide breathing room, but they cannot replace the slow, gritty work of building public trust and accountable institutions. That raises an uncomfortable question: Are regional deployments being used as a substitute for the patient politics Somalia needs?
Wider implications and a choice for the international community
Djibouti’s move is also a reminder that partners who live closest to a crisis often pay the highest price when it destabilises. The Horn’s countries have legitimate security concerns that cross borders: refugee flows, militant safe havens, disrupted trade and the risk of conflict contagion. Yet the global community — from the European Union to Washington and the Gulf capitals — has responsibilities too, especially when national budgets and international peacekeeping coffers are stretched thin.
Policymakers must confront two linked dilemmas: first, how to coordinate disparate national contributions into a coherent stabilisation strategy that complements Somali state-building; and second, how to fund that strategy sustainably. Both require political will more than clever tactics. They also demand honest public communication: the people paying taxes in donor capitals should understand what peacebuilding in Somalia realistically requires.
As Djibouti’s soldiers move toward Somalia’s frontlines, the broader debate returns to old but urgent questions. How much of an intractable problem is Al-Shabaab, and how much of an international coordination problem? Will regional rivalries be allowed to undermine a fragile consensus, or can a patchwork of contributions be shaped into a durable investment in Somali sovereignty?
Those are not questions for diplomats alone. They concern Somalis living under nightly curfews, merchants trying to keep markets open, and families hoping their children will sleep without fear. In the end, stabilisation will be judged not by troop lists but by whether a future generation in Somalia sees a path to normalcy.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
