In response, Ethiopia boldly declared that Egypt “must abandon its aggressive approach,” firmly restating that any discussions on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are firmly within Ethiopia’s jurisdiction. This latest back-and-forth fuels the enduring diplomatic friction between the two nations, intensifying fears of further escalation.
Why is the GERD causing such a stir?
Back in 2011, Ethiopia laid the first stone for what would become a landmark project to bring electricity to millions of its citizens, half of whom live without power. Stretching 1.8 kilometers (1.1 miles) in length and soaring 145 meters (476 feet) high, this colossal dam has the potential to produce 5,000 megawatts of electricity—rivaling Egypt’s Burullus, Beni Suef, and New Capital power plants, each generating around 4,800 megawatts since their 2018 debut.
From the onset and during its early construction phase, Egypt has raised objections against the GERD. The North African country anchors its stance on a 1959 accord with Sudan, a fellow Nile-bordering nation. This agreement evolved from a 1929 treaty signed with British colonizers, addressing the Nile’s shared use as a resource.
The 1929 pact encompassed multiple Eastern African territories—like Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania—heavily reliant on the Nile. Yet, neither these nations nor Ethiopia were consulted. The 1959 adjustment boosted Egypt’s annual water share to 55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan’s to 18.5 billion cubic meters.
When Ethiopia embarked on dam construction, it insisted the project was a matter of national sovereignty. Egypt countered, asserting that the agreements with Sudan entitled it to thwart any Nile waterway constructions. Surprisingly, both nations appeared more pliable a few years into the dam’s development.
In 2015, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan penned a Declaration of Principles (DoP) agreement, committing to several terms, one of which was Ethiopia’s pledge to follow advice from an international panel on the GERD’s impact. However, Ethiopia later reverted to its stance on national sovereignty, refusing an environmental and social impact assessment, typically a prerequisite under international law for such projects.
Since then, diplomatic dialogues continued intermittently, often mediated by the African Union, yielding minimal progress.
“Egypt categorically rejects such unlawful unilateral Ethiopian actions that constitute a continuous material breach of the DoP, which obliges Ethiopia to reach a legally binding agreement on the rules that govern the filling and operation of the GERD before their commencement,” stated Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty in a letter to the UN Security Council.
What’s the latest buzz?
Recently, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed proclaimed the dam had reached the fifth stage of its initial filling, a process started in 2020. He also announced that the dam’s third and fourth turbines are operational.
This advancement spurred Egypt to seemingly issue veiled threats. The nation recently inked a defense pact with Somalia, another country bordering Ethiopia. The agreement entails military support for Somalia’s battle against al-Shabaab, yet also positions Egyptian troops closer to Ethiopia.
Somalia’s murky ties with Ethiopia further deepen this entanglement. Earlier this year, Ethiopia and the self-governing but scarcely recognized North Western of Somaliasealed a port deal, granting Ethiopia access to the Red Sea. Given Somalia’s claim over Somaliland, this move is perceived as a threat, prompting Somalia to align with Egypt.
Following Ahmed’s update, reports surfaced that Egypt had dispatched 1,000 troops and military equipment to Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. Ethiopia then issued a statement expressing vigilant monitoring of regional developments that might jeopardize its security.
In a speech, Ahmed underscored that Ethiopia won’t engage with entities challenging its “sovereignty and dignity.” He warned, “Whoever is planning to invade Ethiopia should think not once but ten times because one of the most important things we Ethiopians know is defense.”
How about Sudan’s role?
The GERD stands in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, merely 15 kilometers (9 miles) from Sudan’s border. Analysts once speculated that Sudan could mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia, given its agreement with Egypt and proximity to Ethiopia. However, Sudan’s ongoing internal conflict dampens such prospects.
Sudan’s position is tricky—any Egyptian military action against the GERD and Ethiopia could embroil Sudan in warfare. This could lead to violations of Sudan’s airspace and potential civilian casualties from dam-induced flooding. Previously, in 2020, heavy rains flooded the Blue Nile, affecting thousands of Sudanese households and devastating over one-third of the country’s farmland.
Interestingly, Sudan can also benefit from cheaper electricity generated by the GERD. This duality places it between honoring the 1959 agreement and tapping into the benefits of a massive dam next door.
Are there any remedies?
Egypt deems the GERD a life-threatening issue without a mutual accord, seeking a guaranteed water share. Ethiopia’s unyielding insistence on sovereignty leaves no easy path to a bilateral agreement.
In April, a collaborative report by University of Manchester scientists and regional organizations introduced a detailed simulator of an integrated energy-water system. This model suggests how international energy trade agreements could potentially ease the Nile water conflict.
The simulator, built on open-source tech, proposes various scenarios for energy trade among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. However, there’s no word if any of the nations have reviewed the report.
Amidst the growing discord, more talks are anticipated, especially between Ethiopia and Egypt, with hopes that a diplomatic breakthrough is on the horizon.
