Somali Salvation Forum alleges government neglects counterterrorism, sells public land

Somalia’s Opposition Sounds the Alarm on Election Timelines and Constitutional Changes

Mogadishu’s political center of gravity shifts—again

In a city where politics is often as kinetic as the traffic circling KM4, Somalia’s opposition has thrown a sharp new challenge at the government. The Somali Salvation Forum, a coalition led by former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, wrapped up a two-day meeting in Mogadishu by accusing federal authorities of losing focus on the war against al-Shabaab and instead prioritizing the sale of public land. The group urged a political reset: hold local elections quickly, stop tinkering with the constitution, and commit—unequivocally—to no extension of the current administration’s term past May 15, 2026.

“To save the country from political uncertainty,” their statement read, “the remaining short time in the term of the Parliament and the President should be used to agree on a viable, inclusive election—better than the one in 2022.” It is a direct rebuke to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s reform agenda and a reminder that Somalia’s political calendar—compressed, fraught, and easily manipulated—can ignite as fast as an afternoon gust over the Indian Ocean.

The constitutional thicket

At the heart of the opposition’s critique is the 2012 Provisional Constitution, a document born out of exhaustion with war and a desire to federate power. The Forum accuses the government of pushing “illegal amendments,” warning of “conflicting legal frameworks” that could tip the country into chaos. It’s not the first time the fine print has stirred trouble. In Somalia, constitutions are less dry parchment than living artifacts—bargains struck between clan elders, regional leaders, and a federal government walking a tightrope between central authority and the autonomy of Federal Member States.

The government’s camp has long argued that the system needs clarity to pave the way for universal suffrage and more predictable governance. The opposition counters that tinkering without consensus risks rupturing the fragile trust that underpins the federal project. This latest standoff comes as some opposition figures—until recently aligned with the Forum—signed a framework agreement with the government on elections. The Forum’s message: not so fast.

Memories of crisis linger

Somalis do not need to dig deep to recall what happens when election timing becomes a bargaining chip. The 2021–22 impasse, marked by barricades in Mogadishu and a series of tense standoffs, ended only after intense mediation and a late-night vote in a hangar-like venue that produced the current president. The Forum’s warning against any talk of extension taps into that collective memory: extensions are a red line for many Somalis and international partners who bankroll security and institutional reforms.

In practice, the opposition’s demands include quick, credible local polls—long promised but rarely delivered—alongside an inclusive deal on how national elections will be conducted. The group also singled out the electoral law, party law, and the presidency’s chosen electoral commission as “a blatant deception,” alleging they are designed to slow-walk the process and ultimately prolong the government’s mandate.

Security vs. statecraft: a contest of priorities

Perhaps the most charged accusation is that Mogadishu has taken its eye off the fight against al-Shabaab. It comes after a tentative government offensive showed early gains, followed by setbacks and a grinding stalemate. In central regions such as Galmudug and Hirshabelle, government-aligned forces and clan militias scored symbolic victories—only to find the insurgents regrouping in rural strongholds and expanding their taxation rackets.

There is also a harder truth behind the rhetoric: state-building and security are not parallel roads; they intersect constantly. Land, for instance, is a potent currency in Somalia’s political economy. Who decides what is “public,” what is “for sale,” and what revenue goes where? Each sale—or perceived sale—can deepen suspicion and feed narratives of favoritism and capture. The Forum’s charge about selling public land lands precisely because the stewardship of state assets remains a test of the government’s legitimacy as much as its efficiency.

Officials in Mogadishu have repeatedly defended their approach, stressing they can pursue governance reforms and an anti-insurgency campaign at once. They often point to institutional milestones and police and military training pipelines, even as they acknowledge the cost of the fight: it is expensive, requires patience, and depends on donors whose priorities are shifting amid crises from the Sahel to Gaza to Ukraine.

Why this matters beyond Somalia

Somalia’s political calendar is now entwined with a regional security ecosystem under strain. The African Union’s mission has begun its drawdown phase. Gulf states are active investors—in ports, real estate, and political influence. The Red Sea corridor and the Horn of Africa remain strategic lanes for global trade and, increasingly, geopolitical rivalry. In this setting, the difference between a contested election plan and a consensus-based one is not academic: it affects whether donors remain engaged, whether insurgents find oxygen, and whether fragile state revenues can be stabilized.

Meanwhile, climate shocks compound the stakes—drought and floods have whiplashed communities and displaced hundreds of thousands in recent years. Elections held amid humanitarian distress can sharpen grievances if people perceive national leaders as inattentive to local crises. If that sounds familiar, it’s because Somalis have lived variations of this script before.

A path through? Inclusive pact, local polls, and patience

The Forum’s prescription—move swiftly to local elections, reverse contested constitutional changes, and jointly shape an electoral roadmap—reads as both a political demand and a governance project. Local polls have an outsized importance: they test voter rolls, party organization, and dispute resolution in a way national elections cannot. When done credibly, they also generate a sense of ownership at the neighborhood level—where politics in Somalia actually breathes.

But time is tight, and compromises are costly. Can the government bring skeptics into the tent without stalling reforms it says are necessary for one-person-one-vote outcomes? Can opposition groups speak with one voice when some of their own have already signed on to a government framework? And can all sides agree on a neutral arbiter for the election infrastructure—the commission, the laws, the rules—in a system where neutrality itself is a contested concept?

Somalia’s political history suggests three practical steps:

• Lock in the May 15, 2026 deadline publicly, with no ambiguity and with parliamentary backing.
• Convene a time-bound, transparent forum to review constitutional changes with Federal Member States, elders, and civil society—before new amendments move forward.
• Pilot local elections in a limited number of districts within months, with independent monitoring and a clear timeline for expansion.

None of this is easy. It requires risk-taking by leaders and patience from constituencies accustomed to quick wins. But Somalis also know the cost of drift: when deadlines wobble and the basic rules of the game shift midstream, it’s the street-level economy—drivers, market traders, remittance-dependent families—that pays first.

For now, the Forum’s salvo has clarified the stakes. It has also given the government a choice: treat the critique as an obstacle, or use it as a spur to craft a broader consensus, starting with local elections that give people something tangible to believe in. In Mogadishu’s humid mornings, where tea stalls fill before dawn and politics is the daily soundtrack, that kind of trust-building would be the most radical reform of all.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.