Somalia’s next election is unlikely to be a direct, one person, one vote contest. Time constraints and the limits of the current federal institutions point instead to another indirect vote. The decisive question is not the model, but whether the process can meet a minimum threshold of credibility. After two troubled cycles in 2016/17 and 2021/22, an integrity-first approach is the only path to an indirect election that voters, candidates and institutions can accept.
Those past votes did not fail because indirect elections are inherently illegitimate. They failed because the bodies charged with running them lacked independence and authority. The Federal Indirect Electoral Implementation Team (FIEIT), the State-level Indirect Electoral Implementation Teams (SIEITs) and the Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanism (EDRM) were, on paper, independent. In practice they were assembled through political bargaining, stocked with members beholden to incumbents or dominant actors, and vulnerable to pressure at every stage.
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The consequences were predictable and corrosive: altered delegate lists; selective enforcement of rules; opaque credentialing for observers; and tolerance for violations inside polling sites. In too many instances, polling environments were manipulated, access was restricted and campaigning occurred inside voting areas. When selection of electoral bodies is politicized, neutrality in execution becomes impossible—and public trust collapses.
Public debate has often chased the wrong fixes. Proposals to simply expand delegate numbers or add more voting centers address symptoms, not causes. Without structural safeguards against political capture, coercion and corruption, Somalia’s next indirect election will replicate the same legitimacy crisis.
A credible path forward requires reforming who runs the process, how state power touches it and where manipulation can realistically be deterred. An integrity framework can be built within existing constitutional arrangements while changing the incentives that determine behavior during the election.
First, rebalance the composition of electoral bodies. Instead of unilateral appointment by the incumbent government, a three-key mechanism would dilute partisan control and strengthen neutrality: 33% of members nominated by the government, 33% by the opposition and 34% drawn from technically qualified civil society professionals. Short, fixed mandates limited to the electoral cycle and public disclosure of affiliations would further reduce incentives for capture. This is not an abstract reform. It targets the root cause of previous failures: partisan domination of institutions meant to be impartial.
Second, restore state neutrality—especially around security and public resources. In previous cycles, vehicles, fuel, escorts and funds were routinely harnessed for preferred candidates. District officials controlled permits and venues in ways that advantaged some and excluded others. Security forces were perceived as political instruments rather than neutral guarantors. Such practices do more than skew competition; they erode confidence in the state itself.
A preventative fix is both feasible and urgent. During a designated election window—say, 60 days—security for polling sites should be removed from routine federal and state ministerial control and placed under a temporary Electoral Security Committee. Comprising AUSSOM and the Somali Police and reporting directly to a reformed FIEIT, this structure would create deterrence during the process, not just consequences afterward. The aim is to prevent violations before they happen.
Third, protect the most vulnerable stage: delegate selection. This is where credibility is won or lost. In past cycles, political actors handpicked delegates, displaced legitimate elders, violated clan balance rules and relocated selection to private residences and hotels. By the time ballots were cast, outcomes were already skewed.
Safeguards must be enforceable and straightforward. Delegate selection should be held in publicly announced venues with attendance registers and documented outcomes posted transparently. Eligibility should exclude political aides, government employees and security personnel. A fast-track review should allow sub-clan members and civil society observers to flag and resolve irregularities before electoral colleges are finalized. When the foundation is credible, every later stage is harder to corrupt.
Fourth, raise the cost of vote-buying. Small delegate pools, predictable voting patterns and controlled accommodations made bribery efficient. Eliminating corruption outright is unrealistic. Making it inefficient is achievable. Increasing the number of delegates per seat—for example, from 101 to 301—would dilute the impact of cash and require more complex operations to sway outcomes. Adding a lottery element at the final voting stage injects uncertainty that makes bribery a riskier investment. These measures do not seek moral perfection; they rewire incentives so manipulation becomes expensive and unreliable.
Fifth, blunt coercion. Threats, intimidation and travel restrictions have repeatedly shaped outcomes behind closed doors. Denial has not worked. Practical steps can reduce coercion’s effectiveness: broadened delegate pools make individual targeting harder; transparent security deployment and clear operational separation between those providing security and those issuing political instructions help de-escalate fear. Elections conducted in a climate of intimidation may produce winners, but they cannot confer legitimacy.
Sixth, shift disputes from outcomes to processes. Past cycles were marred by missing ballots, inconsistent procedures, restricted observation and altered results. Complaint mechanisms too often focused on overturning seats, inviting escalation. A process-first posture would favor remedies such as repeat counting, administrative warnings and replacement of compromised staff. When outcomes are not easily reversible, the incentive to litigate politically diminishes.
Relatedly, redesign dispute resolution for de-escalation. High filing fees, unclear deadlines and political pressure blunted the EDRM’s effectiveness. Lowering barriers to complaints, removing financial deterrents and emphasizing early administrative fixes can contain disputes before they metastasize. Nullifying a seat should be reserved for extreme, well-documented violations—not wielded as a routine political weapon.
Finally, remove economic barriers that exclude capable candidates, particularly women and younger aspirants. High registration fees and entrenched patriarchal constraints narrow the field. Practical adjustments—reduced fees for women and youth, transparent fee schedules set before the electoral calendar begins, and concrete links between gender inclusion and control over delegate processes—can broaden participation without reopening constitutional questions.
None of these steps require reinvention of Somalia’s political system. They demand discipline, transparency and a commitment to neutral administration. They also recognize that in the coming cycle, perfection is not possible. Credibility is. A more balanced appointment of electoral bodies can insulate procedures from partisan capture. A firewall around security can deter misuse of state power. Clean delegate selection can restore legitimacy at the base. And smarter incentives can make bribery and coercion less decisive.
Failing to confront these integrity challenges will not merely repeat the mistakes of 2016/17 and 2021/22. It will deepen fragmentation and further erode public trust. With time short and expectations low, Somalia still has an opening to deliver an indirect election that is measurably more transparent, inclusive and legitimate than its predecessors. That starts with an integrity framework fit for the realities on the ground—and the resolve to enforce it.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
