Has Puntland State turned the tide against Islamic State? A closer look at President Deni’s claims
What the president said
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In a recent televised interview, Puntland State President Said Abdullahi Deni delivered a blunt assessment of a years‑long counter‑insurgency: he said his forces have “severely weakened” Islamic State in the northeastern Somali region of Bari, claiming more than 2,000 fighters — many foreign nationals — who once operated from the Cal Miskaad mountain range have been “largely neutralized.”
Deni described a security campaign that uprooted bases, weapons stockpiles and even small arms workshops. He credited Puntland State intelligence with foiling a planned ISIS attack on the port city of Bosaso in June, and thanked the United States and the United Arab Emirates for what he termed “visible support” in the form of airstrikes and intelligence sharing. His estimate: a 95 percent reduction in the group’s power in the region.
A costly victory
The president did not sugarcoat the price. He acknowledged that “hundreds” of Puntland State soldiers were killed and thousands wounded during the operations. That toll — if borne out by independent tallies — marks a heavy sacrifice for a semi‑autonomous region already stretched by drought, displacement and economic strains.
For locals, the Cal Miskaad — a jagged escarpment rising above barren plains — has long been both refuge and risk. Its caves and ravines offer concealment for armed groups, while nearby communities rely on pastoralist livelihoods and seasonal trade routes that cross the mountains. Insecurity corrodes those rhythms: traders delay convoys to Bosaso, families postpone trips to market, and the steady flow of remittances from the diaspora becomes an uncertain lifeline.
How to read the numbers
Claims of combat success in conflict zones carry both signal and spin. Deni’s figures — 2,000 fighters, 95 percent degradation — are striking and suggest a major rearrangement of militant capabilities in northeastern Somalia. Yet they also invite questions that independent monitors should answer: Who counted these fighters, and over what timeframe? How many were killed, captured or surrendered? How many were local recruits, and how many were foreign nationals? International organizations and independent researchers have repeatedly warned that militant groups often fragment into smaller, harder‑to‑detect cells while retaining the capacity for violent strikes.
It is equally important to note a broader trend: as ISIS was dismantled in Iraq and Syria, affiliates and sympathisers sought new footholds across Africa and South Asia. Somalia’s ISIS faction has never approached the size or reach of al‑Shabab, the larger Islamist insurgency that dominates swathes of southern and central Somalia. But even diminished, small, mobile cells can be dangerous — capable of assassinations, hit‑and‑run attacks, and the kind of terror incidents that spread fear far beyond their numbers.
Regional and global implications
The strategic stakes go beyond Puntland State’s borders. Bosaso is not just a Somali city; it is a Red Sea‑linked port that serves Somalia’s northeast and as a gateway to Gulf markets. An attack there would have sent reverberations through regional trade networks and heightened concerns among Gulf states and international shipping interests.
That is why the involvement of external partners — notably the United States and the UAE, both mentioned by Deni — matters. U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa have shifted over the last decade from large‑scale interventions to a mix of targeted strikes, intelligence cooperation and training. The UAE, too, has invested in Somali security projects and ports. Such partnerships can be decisive, but they are also political: foreign support is often calibrated to broader diplomatic and economic interests in the region.
What this means for civilians and governance
Military gains against militants must be matched by governance to be lasting. Puntland State’s security forces may have cleared or disrupted ISIS infrastructure, but long‑term stability will depend on restoring basic services, rebuilding trust with local communities, and creating economic opportunities that undercut recruitment. Where young men see few alternatives, the allure of armed groups — with their mixture of money, identity and brutality — persists.
Moreover, the shadow of displacement and trauma lingers. The families of soldiers killed in action, civilians caught in crossfire, and communities that hosted foreign fighters will need accountability and aid. Without transparent investigations into alleged abuses on all sides, the cycle of grievance can feed new forms of violence.
Questions that remain
- Can the Puntland State administration produce independently verifiable evidence of the scale of its success?
- Will foreign partners continue to provide air and intelligence support, and under what terms?
- How will Puntland State translate battlefield gains into governance that prevents militant resurgence?
- And crucially: what happens to the surrendering or captured fighters — local reintegration, prosecution, or continued detention?
President Deni’s account, whether wholly accurate or not, offers a welcome note of optimism in a part of Somalia that has seen chronic instability. But it also underscores a familiar pattern: military pressure can shrink a threat in the short term, yet without political, economic and social repair the conditions that spawned that threat remain. The real test for Puntland State will be to convert tactical victories in the Cal Miskaad into durable security for its people.
As the Horn of Africa watches, the world should ask not only whether ISIS has been broken in one mountain range, but whether the institutions and reconciliation needed to prevent its return are being built — and fast enough.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
