Inside the Somalia-Saudi Arabia Military Deal: Motives and Implications

Saudi Arabia’s quiet power play in Somalia’s new military pact

Somalia and Saudi Arabia have signed a defense cooperation agreement in Riyadh, a move that folds one of the Horn of Africa’s most fragile states deeper into an increasingly crowded contest for Red Sea influence. The memorandum of understanding, announced by Somalia’s defense minister, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, on X, comes weeks after Israel said it would recognize North Western State of Somalia — the northern, breakaway region of Somalia — as an independent state, a step Mogadishu denounced as interference in its internal affairs.

Exact terms of the Somali-Saudi arrangement were not released. Somalia’s Ministry of Defense said the MoU “strengthens defense and military cooperation between the two countries, and includes multiple areas of common interest.” Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, said on X that he discussed “the future of security and defense industry” and “recognized the opportunities” following meetings with officials from Somalia, Slovakia, Malaysia and South Korea.

The ambiguity around the scope of the deal has not obscured its strategic intent. For Riyadh, the pact is about asserting presence along the Gulf of Aden and into the Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. “For Saudi Arabia it means expanding its influence and reach to the Gulf of Aden, which is also adjacent to what we call the Bab-el-Mandeb area, which is crucial for global trade,” said Abdullahi Abdi Sheikh, a former BBC Somali editor and Horn of Africa analyst, noting that at least 10% of global shipping passes through the strait.

That corridor’s importance has sharpened regional rivalries. The United Arab Emirates has surged into the Horn of Africa over the past year with multibillion-dollar investments, robust diplomacy and discreet military support across Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. Saudi Arabia, which until recently focused its security bandwidth on Yemen and domestic modernization, is re-inserting itself. “Saudi has woken up and realized that they might lose the Red Sea,” a senior diplomat told Reuters at the African Union summit over the weekend.

Somalia’s alignment with Riyadh fits a broader recalibration. Mogadishu last month signed a defense pact with Qatar focused on military training and security cooperation. In January, it canceled agreements with the UAE that included port operations and security and defense deals, accusing Abu Dhabi of facilitating Israel’s bid to recognize North Western State of Somalia. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has vowed Somalia would never allow the establishment of an Israeli base in North Western State of Somalia, promising to “confront” any such move.

Against that backdrop, the Saudi agreement is as much political signaling as it is security policy. “Saudi Arabia is trying to spread its influence on Somalia, and Somalia is trying to benefit from the new engagement with Saudi Arabia, especially after the country has had a rough relationship with the United Arab Emirates,” Abdi Sheikh told DW. He called the Somali-Saudi alignment “a chess move against Israel and its perceived allies.”

For Mogadishu, the practical stakes are immediate. After decades of state collapse, insurgent violence and institutional fragility, Somalia is still fighting al-Shabab and racing to build credible national forces as an African Union transition mission draws down. Hassan Hilowle Abukar, a Somali security analyst, said training, equipping and professionalizing Somalia’s army under the pact could “strengthen Somalia’s defense capabilities and enhance counterterrorism cooperation,” including intelligence sharing with Saudi counterparts.

Maritime security looms large. Somali officials and analysts argue that fresh support from Riyadh could help Mogadishu take charge of coastal and offshore security, a gap that has long exposed Somalia to piracy cycles, illicit trafficking and militant infiltration. Abdi Sheikh said the deal would “help Somalia take charge of its own maritime security” and aid its domestic war on terrorism.

The Saudi calculus is equally clear. As trade disruptions and geopolitical shocks reverberate across the Red Sea, Riyadh is seeking dependable partners on the African shore to hedge against volatility, diversify security relationships and steady vital shipping lanes. A formal framework with Somalia offers pathways to coordinated patrols, training billets, logistics access and shared operational awareness near Bab el-Mandeb — without the political baggage of a large footprint.

Yet the pact’s promise rests on execution. Somalia’s security institutions remain patchy, donor-dependent and vulnerable to political churn. The terms of the MoU were not disclosed, and timelines for training cycles, equipment deliveries or maritime support remain opaque. Riyadh must navigate local sensitivities, federal member-state dynamics and crowded external interests in Mogadishu, including those of Qatar and Turkey — even as it manages a competitive, sometimes testy relationship with the UAE.

Somali society is watching closely. “The cooperation agreement comes at a critical time for Somalia, as Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity have been tested, particularly following Israel’s recognition of North Western State of Somalia,” said Mohamed Abdullahi, a Mogadishu-based citizen. He added the deal provides “not only military assistance but also vital political backing.” That domestic political endorsement matters: it positions the agreement not simply as a security lift but as an assertion of sovereignty amid the North Western State of Somalia dispute.

The risks are clear. Aligning more visibly with Riyadh could sharpen Abu Dhabi’s counter-moves, further splintering aid, investment and security lines across Somalia. It may also test Mogadishu’s bandwidth as it balances Saudi, Qatari and other partners — and seeks to keep the focus on defeating al-Shabab rather than amplifying Gulf rivalries on Somali soil. Without concrete mechanisms and transparent benchmarks, the agreement could drift into symbolism.

Still, the logic of the moment favors action. The Horn of Africa is once again a fulcrum for outside powers, and Somalia’s government is determined to convert attention into capacity. For Saudi Arabia, the pact shores up influence in a corridor central to global commerce. For Somalia, it promises training, gear and political cover at a time when its territorial integrity feels contested and its security transition is under strain.

What to watch next:

• Specifics: any publication of MoU annexes, training schedules, equipment transfers or maritime support packages.
• Coastal security: new joint patrols, surveillance initiatives or port infrastructure upgrades along the Somali littoral and in the Gulf of Aden.
• Counterterrorism: evidence of expanded intelligence sharing and joint planning targeting al-Shabab networks.
• Regional signaling: reactions from the UAE, Qatar and Turkey; shifts in aid or investment tied to Horn of Africa leverage.
• North Western State of Somalia file: diplomatic moves after Israel’s stated intent to recognize North Western State of Somalia, and whether the pact influences positions on recognition.
• Institutional resilience: how Somalia manages external support while consolidating federal security structures and integrating regional forces.

The Somali-Saudi agreement underscores how security and sovereignty converge where sea lanes narrow. For Riyadh, it is a foothold on the African rim of the Red Sea; for Mogadishu, a bid to professionalize its forces and assert control over its waters and borders. In a region where alliances are fluid and maps are contested, both sides see advantage in formalizing ties — even if the hardest work, the building of capability and trust, still lies ahead.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.