Incoming AFRICOM chief vows sustained U.S. support for Somalia’s al‑Shabaab fight

New AFRICOM chief in Mogadishu pledges deeper U.S. support against al-Shabaab and ISIS

Mogadishu—On a humid Wednesday on the Indian Ocean, as traffic in the capital thinned for afternoon prayers, the new commander of U.S. Africa Command slipped into Villa Somalia for a first meeting with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. General Dagvin R. M. Anderson, newly in charge of America’s military footprint on the continent, promised that Washington will sustain—and sharpen—its support for Somali forces battling al-Shabaab and a smaller ISIS offshoot.

The visit, part of an inaugural tour of African nations hosting U.S. troops, carried a clear message: the United States intends to remain a central security partner in the Horn of Africa even as the African Union mission transitions and regional power politics shift.

A timely visit amid shifting sands

Anderson briefed President Hassan Sheikh on AFRICOM’s counterterrorism strategy and discussed ways to expand cooperation: more precise airstrikes when Somali troops are in contact with militants, deeper intelligence sharing, and intensified training and logistical support for the Somali National Army. “A vital partnership,” President Hassan Sheikh said afterward, promising to “intensify international cooperation to achieve peace and stability in Somalia and the region.”

That language echoes years of joint operations that have pushed al-Shabaab out of parts of central Somalia while exposing the limits of military action in a conflict that is as much political as it is kinetic. The timing matters. As African Union peacekeepers draw down and a leaner follow-on presence takes shape, Somali forces are assuming greater responsibility for security—just as al-Shabaab seeks to exploit any vacuum.

In conversations with Somali and American officials, you now hear a pragmatic refrain: gains are real but fragile. The group remains potent, raising millions of dollars a month through extortion, checkpoints, and a shadow tax system that rivals the state’s reach in some corridors. ISIS in Somalia is smaller, tucked largely into the mountains of Puntland State, but persistent enough to complicate security planning.

What stepped-up support looks like

U.S. officials frame their role as “by, with, and through” the Somali government rather than an open-ended combat mission. In practice, that means a narrow footprint of a few hundred U.S. personnel in Somalia, periodic airstrikes in defense of partner forces, and a pipeline of training and equipment designed to make Somali units more mobile and more cohesive across federal and regional lines.

The Somali National Army has made headline gains since 2022, particularly in Galmudug and Hirshabelle. But retaking ground is one thing; holding it is another. Security analysts point to three recurring obstacles: fragmented command chains between Mogadishu and federal member states, strain on logistics in remote areas where poor roads and seasonal floods can grind operations to a halt, and the challenge of stabilizing liberated towns quickly with police, courts, and basic services. Without that, insurgents return.

AFRICOM’s latest playbook emphasizes enabling Somali leadership on the front lines and pairing operations with local stabilization efforts—support to district councils, community policing, and reconciliation with clans that have complicated loyalties. It is a bet that mixing security with governance can undercut al-Shabaab’s appeal more effectively than airpower alone.

Regional stakes beyond Somalia

Wednesday’s talks did not stop at Somalia’s borders. Officials discussed a wider security picture that has grown more volatile: periodic al-Shabaab raids into Kenya’s northeast and coastal Lamu County; the 2022 incursion toward Ethiopia’s Somali Region that startled Addis Ababa; and the testy geopolitics between Somalia and Ethiopia that flared last year over Addis Ababa’s hunt for Red Sea access. Cross-border coordination—between Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti on the one hand and Somali authorities on the other—will be decisive.

Washington’s approach has often been to play convener, quietly nudging capitals to share intelligence, standardize training, and prevent cross-border operations from becoming political flashpoints. That’s harder when national interest and domestic politics pull in different directions. But it is familiar terrain: the Horn’s security problems do not respect lines on a map, and without a regional compact, local victories tend to evaporate under pressure.

A long war with local roots

For those who know Mogadishu, the rhythms of this conflict are visible in small things. The tea stalls that fill after dusk, where men scroll their phones and trade news in a mix of Somali and Arabic; the concrete blast barriers that divide neighborhoods from ministries; the coastal breeze that clears the dust on Lido Beach, where families return on Fridays to reclaim the simple ritual of city life. Progress here is not linear. A new school opens; a suicide blast scars a market; a police unit patrols a district it once abandoned at night. The story of the last decade has been uneven but forward.

The United States has moved in parallel. A troop withdrawal ordered in 2020 gave way to a measured return in 2022. Since then, U.S. forces have conducted dozens of strikes each year in support of Somali units, while quietly advising elite formations that spearhead operations. Rights groups regularly warn about civilian risk; AFRICOM publishes periodic assessments and—unlike many militaries—now issues public summaries when it deems civilian harm credible. For Somalis caught between militants and the state, transparency matters as much as precision.

What to watch next

• Security transition: As the African Union’s mission recedes, watch whether Somali forces can hold secondary towns and key supply routes without allied brigades anchoring their flanks.
• Revenue and governance: Al-Shabaab’s tax machine is a strategic center of gravity. Can the government expand formal revenue collection in newly secured areas and protect local businesses from extortion?
• Regional diplomacy: Heightened tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia risk overshadowing security cooperation. Quiet shuttle diplomacy by the African Union and partners, including the U.S., will be critical.
• Humanitarian pressure: Flood-drought cycles and displacement—millions remain uprooted—stretch the social fabric. Security gains rarely stick where services and livelihoods collapse.

General Anderson’s visit closed without the theatrics of a major announcement. But the subtext was clear: a handover is underway—from an international security scaffolding to a Somali-led architecture that must work in rough conditions, with imperfect tools, and under the gaze of a public that has carried this conflict far too long. The United States is betting that steadier training, intelligence, and targeted strikes can help Somali forces bend the curve.

It is a familiar bet, and a cautious one. Whether it succeeds will hinge less on what happens from the skies and more on what happens after the shooting stops: the judge who returns to his bench, the mayor who collects taxes transparently, the police unit that treats the next roadblock as a conversation, not a shakedown. These are the small victories that insurgents cannot match—and the ones Somalis say they need most.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.