In Mogadishu’s Dec. 25 municipal vote, the promise of direct democracy met the reality of centralized power. Marketed as a landmark step toward universal suffrage and a prelude to Somalia’s 2026 presidential contest, the election in the Banadir region looked—by design and outcome—like a nomination process dressed up as a popular mandate. That tension goes to the core of Somalia’s electoral dilemma: in a fragile state without a census, credible registries or impartial institutions, the rush to “one person, one vote” can entrench executive control rather than dilute it.
Since 1969, successive mayors of the capital have reflected the primacy of Villa Somalia, not municipal pluralism. The capital’s administration has often functioned as a revenue engine for patronage—funding loyal political elites, social media mobilizers and select clan elders. The latest effort under the ruling Justice and Solidarity group symbolically adopted direct voting but maintained practical control through the electoral commission, security forces, public resources and tailored rules. The pattern surfaced in outcomes: ruling-aligned blocs and affiliated clans captured local councils across key Banadir districts such as Karan, Hodan and Danyele, consolidating the center’s hand.
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The opposition largely refused to legitimize the process. Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who leads the Himilo political organization, rejected the vote as manipulated. Wadajir party leader Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame and former Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble also refused to recognize or participate. Major political currents boycotted the exercise, denying it the breadth of competition that confers legitimacy even in imperfect systems.
Why proceed this way? The calculation is straightforward. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has cast direct local polls in Mogadishu as a staging ground for broader direct elections. But in the Somali context, direct contests are easier to bend than the indirect federal election—decided by 329 legislators in the House of the People and Upper House—because there is no nationwide census, voter rolls are unreliable, institutions are weak and electoral bodies reflect installed loyalties. The paradox is stark: the indirect system, though elitist and flawed, can be less manipulable than poorly safeguarded mass voting.
For more than a decade, Somalia has relied on elite bargains to navigate its politics: indirect, clan-based power-sharing arrangements renewed roughly every four years under heavy diplomatic pressure and financial underwriting from European partners and the United States. These deals—such as the 2012 accord involving the Transitional Federal Government with Puntland State, Galmudug and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a, and later frameworks in 2016 and 2021 between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS)—were far from democratic in the liberal sense. But they bound adversaries to a process, forestalling open conflict and allowing the state-building track begun in 2000 to inch forward.
That fragile equilibrium is showing strain. Across Somalia, clans informally “own” parliamentary slots, while sub-clans complain of exclusion from seat allocations. The claim of universal suffrage collides with weak courts, limited security, scarce funds and tight timelines. Elevating a direct vote absent safeguards does not resolve these contradictions; it magnifies them.
The human context makes the gamble more perilous. Somalis endure recurrent drought and famine risks. Many households in and around Mogadishu struggle for daily sustenance amid widespread unemployment and deep poverty. Access to basic services—health care, primary education, clean water—remains constrained by insecurity and soaring costs, especially outside the better-policed corridor along Maka al-Mukarama and the airport. In that reality, an election perceived as engineered for incumbents hardens cynicism and invites confrontation.
Previous indirect cycles were themselves marred by bribery, intimidation and horse-trading that served FGS and FMS elites more than citizens. Yet those flawed bargains kept gunfire at bay. The worst-case scenario now is not a return to the status quo ante; it is escalation. An extension engineered by one side, a unilateral parliamentary selection, or a parallel poll organized by aggrieved rivals would splinter the arena and raise the risk of violence—undoing the limited consensus built over two decades.
Somalia’s path to a credible 2026 presidential transition does not run through rhetorical commitments to universal suffrage alone. It runs through a renewed political settlement that clarifies the rules of the game, shares the burden of administering them and sets feasible guardrails in a country where state capacity is thin. That requires the presidency, federal member states, organized political groups, recognized clan elders, civil society and independent intellectuals at the same table—backed by external partners—but with a premium on Somali-led design and enforcement.
What should that settlement include? The goal is to contain the contest, not suppress it; to channel competition into predictable procedures that preserve an opening for reform while minimizing the incentives for violence. Key steps are within reach if the will exists:
- Constitute a truly independent electoral commission: Selected through consultation among the FGS, FMS and opposition groups, endorsed by all sides and confirmed by the federal parliament. Mandate full transparency and equal access to information.
- Reaffirm the delegate-based mechanism for the federal vote: Limit the role of political offices in appointing or “assigning” winners. Empower only recognized clan elders to name delegates, with combinations of sub-clan delegates electing two or three seats within a larger clan to dilute monopolies.
- Embed oversight and remedies: Guarantee civil society participation in vetting and monitoring delegate selection. Grant the High Court explicit authority to nullify tainted results. Allow local and international observers unfettered access.
- Criminalize and deter coercion: Enforce penalties for buying seats, intimidating candidates or delegates, and misusing public resources or security services to tilt outcomes.
- Sequencing and timelines: Agree on a realistic calendar that avoids manufactured urgency and forecloses unilateral extensions. Codify sanctions for parties that breach the timetable.
None of this will fully democratize Somalia in one cycle. But it can steady the arena long enough to create space for incremental reforms—stronger courts, better financial controls, credible registries—that make future direct elections viable rather than vulnerable.
Meanwhile, the next government’s legitimacy will depend less on how loudly it invokes universal suffrage than on what it delivers. Priorities should be unambiguous: security and the building of inclusive national forces; basic education and health; targeted social protection and livelihoods; and day-to-day governance that reduces predation, fosters social cohesion and begins to restore trust. These are the dividends citizens recognize, even when the ballot is imperfect.
Somalia’s leaders face a choice. They can chase rapid, symbolic votes that consolidate incumbency at the cost of cohesion. Or they can strike a sober pact that accepts limits, shares control and keeps antagonists inside the tent long enough to grow institutions. In Mogadishu’s December experiment, the country saw where the first path leads. The second is harder—but it is the only one that points toward a peaceful 2026 and a state capable of eventually conducting the kind of direct election Somalis deserve.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
