Egypt’s Somalia Gamble: Peacekeeping, Power Plays, and a Dam That Won’t Go Away
On paper, Egypt’s plan to send troops to Somalia is a textbook peacekeeping deployment under an African Union mandate. In practice, it lands squarely on the fault lines of one of Africa’s thorniest rivalries: Cairo versus Addis Ababa, with the Horn of Africa as the stage and the Nile as the subtext.
- Advertisement -
Egypt says its soldiers are going to Somalia to help fight al-Shabaab and stabilize a country clawing its way out of decades of war. Ethiopia hears something very different: a military move on its doorstep at a time when tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remain unresolved and the scars from a controversial port deal with North Western State of Somalia are still fresh.
The mission, by the numbers
Egypt has prepared to contribute around 5,000 troops to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with another 5,000 assigned to bolster security at key sites inside the country. A senior Egyptian military delegation—special units included—has already been on the ground to coordinate the deployment with Somali and African forces. This follows earlier shipments of Egyptian military equipment to Mogadishu, including anti-aircraft guns and artillery delivered by warship, according to reports last year.
From Mogadishu’s perspective, the move comes at a pivotal time. Somali authorities have signaled an end to the mission of up to 10,000 Ethiopian soldiers operating on Somali soil, while Ethiopia says it currently has roughly 4,000 troops in the country. Somalia’s Ministry of Defense welcomed the Egyptian deployment, saying it reflects Cairo’s “growing role” in shoring up stability and strengthening the Somali National Army.
Somalia’s defense minister, Abdulkadir Nur, was more pointed: “Somalia has passed the stage where they were dictated to… We know our own interests, and we will choose between our allies and our enemies. Thank you Egypt.”
Ethiopia Sees a Shadow War
Ethiopia’s ambassador in Mogadishu, Suleiman Dedefo, called Egyptian troops a “political and strategic challenge,” saying they bring “no security benefit” to Somalia. “If they are useful,” he added, “it will be in neighboring countries such as Palestine, Libya or Sudan”—a quip that underscored Addis Ababa’s skepticism about Cairo’s intentions across the region.
For Ethiopia, history and geography inform the anxiety. The GERD, which Addis Ababa plans to inaugurate in a major ceremony in September, is a defining national project and a lightning rod for tensions with Egypt. Cairo, almost entirely dependent on the Nile for fresh water, sees the dam as an existential issue. Addis defends it as a sovereign right and a pathway to development. Decade-long negotiations have gone nowhere fast, turning the dam into a kind of structural dispute—one that bleeds into almost every corridor of Egyptian-Ethiopian relations.
Against that backdrop, every Egyptian move in Somalia can look like encirclement, and every Ethiopian presence like interference. When Addis Ababa signed a memorandum of understanding with North Western State of Somalia in January 2024—granting access to a port, logistics facilities and a military base—Somalia erupted in protest. Egypt stood firmly with Mogadishu. Turkish mediation produced a principles agreement that sought to protect Somali unity while negotiating Ethiopian port access through Mogadishu. The deal remains frozen.
Peacekeeping Through a Political Prism
Egypt’s case is straightforward: it is one of the world’s most active contributors to peacekeeping operations, it has historic ties with Somalia, and it wants to help a partner fight a ruthless insurgency. Cairo’s semi-official circles say Ethiopia is exaggerating every Egyptian step to poison regional cooperation and spook other African capitals.
There is truth in both narratives. Al-Shabaab remains a lethal force. Attacks continue almost daily. The group is entrenched enough to tax some communities and fluid enough to exploit political vacuums. Somalia’s army has made gains, and ATMIS has helped, but the work is far from over. An influx of trained, coordinated troops—if properly integrated—could matter on the ground.
Yet AU mandates don’t float in a vacuum. Somalia sits near the chokepoint of the Bab el-Mandeb, a maritime artery that channels global trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The Horn is a theater where Turkey, the Gulf states, and Western partners jostle alongside regional powers. When Ethiopia demands that the mission “not pose a threat” to its national security, it is naming the region’s defining tension: can a peacekeeping umbrella shelter adversaries without turning into a proxy arena?
The Somali center of gravity
For Somalia, the stakes are immediate. Welcoming Egyptian troops signals a confident turn in Mogadishu’s diplomacy: choosing partners on its own terms and rejecting external vetoes. That has domestic resonance. It also has risks. Peacekeeping only works when the host state keeps its house in order—when soldiers deploy under clear rules, coordinate with local forces, and avoid the perception of taking sides in non-military disputes.
The African Union Peace and Security Council has approved Egyptian participation, and Egypt and Somalia signed a military cooperation protocol last August covering 2025 to 2029. The framework exists. The question is execution. Will Egyptian troops focus strictly on counterterror missions, joint training, and securing vital sites? Will they engage through Somali command-and-control structures? Will Addis Ababa see impartial conduct—or cumulative pressure?
The Dam That Shapes the Horizon
It is difficult to unspool Somalia’s security story from the blue thread of the Nile. The GERD is the longest-running diplomatic crisis in the neighborhood. Resolving it would remove the gravitational force dragging every Egyptian-Ethiopian interaction into confrontation—from port deals to peacekeeping rosters. But a solution requires compromise that neither capital, for now, is ready to make. For Cairo, a legally binding agreement on water releases; for Addis, the freedom to operate a sovereign asset as it sees fit. Those positions remain far apart.
So the Horn adjusts around the stalemate. Turkey tries to mediate, then stalls. Ethiopia eyes the sea. Egypt looks to old allies. Somalia asserts its voice. And each move sounds louder than it might in quieter times.
What to Watch Next
- Mandate clarity: How tightly will Egyptian operations adhere to ATMIS structures, and how transparently will they be reported?
- Regional temperature: Does the GERD inauguration in Addis Ababa harden rhetoric—or open a window for fresh talks?
- Somali sovereignty in practice: Can Mogadishu manage multiple security partners without reigniting rivalries on its soil?
- Al-Shabaab’s adaptation: Does the group exploit the diplomatic rift, or does sustained pressure constrict its room to maneuver?
In Mogadishu, a Somali officer once told me that peacekeeping “works best when nobody notices it.” In the Horn of Africa, that’s a luxury seldom afforded. The best-case scenario is boring: Egyptian units slot into a disciplined AU mission, Somali forces grow stronger, and Ethiopia reads the deployment as security, not strategy. The worst-case scenario is more familiar: suspicion hardens, proxy logic takes root, and Somalia becomes the screen onto which bigger neighbors project their fears.
Between those poles lies the test of African multilateralism. Can the AU—so often asked to reconcile competing sovereignties—keep the Somalia file focused on police stations and training drills rather than dams and ports? The region could use a quiet answer.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
