The rift between Egypt and Ethiopia has hit a boiling point recently. The discord stems back to 2011, when Ethiopia began building the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, igniting Egypt’s fears over its water and food security. Recently, tensions heightened further following Egypt’s rapprochement with Ethiopia’s foe, Somalia.
On August 27, Egypt dispatched two C-130 military aircraft brimming with weapons and ammunition to Mogadishu. This marked Egypt’s first military aid to Somalia in over four decades, ruffling feathers in Addis Ababa and eliciting a sharp rebuke from Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. He proclaimed Ethiopia would not remain passive while “measures to destabilize the region” were in play.
Earlier, on August 14, Cairo inked a defense pact with Somalia, agreeing to send 5,000 troops by year’s end to join the new African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) replacing the African Union Transition Mission (ATMIS). This marks Egypt’s maiden contribution to AU peacekeeping in Somalia. The new mission will enforce peace-building, institutional reforms, and civil servant capacity-building. Egypt reportedly plans another 5,000 troops, although specifics on whether these will replace the 10,000 Ethiopian ATMIS troops are murky. Additionally, as tensions rise, Somalia has even hinted at expelling Ethiopian forces under the new mission.
Egypt is also planning joint military exercises with Somalia, covering land, air, and sea forces, potentially signalling defiance to Ethiopia regarding the dam issue. As political science professor Hassan Nafaa from Cairo University implied, “It’s no shocker Cairo uses any chance to station troops in Somalia.” He added that positioning Egyptian soldiers along the Ethiopia-Somalia border was intended as a “deterrent,” pressuring Addis Ababa to reconsider its stance on the dam.
“Strategically placing forces here could make Egypt a key player if things go south,” Nafaa emphasized.
Why Addis Ababa is Concerned
Egypt’s arms-deep support for Somalia unsettles Addis Ababa, already at odds with Mogadishu over a maritime pact Ethiopia signed with North Western State of Somalia in January. That deal grants Ethiopia port access to Berbera and a 50-year lease on 12.4 miles of coastline for a naval base, provoking Mogadishu’s ire and prompting the recall of its ambassador from Ethiopia.
Emboldened by Egyptian backing, Somali authorities vowed to support anti-Ethiopian groups if Addis Ababa proceeds with the coastal agreement. Although Turkey attempted mediation, notable progress remains elusive. The third negotiation round, set for September 17, was postponed by Somalia without official reason, yet Ethiopian news outlet Borkena warned that Egypt’s involvement could complicate Ankara-initiated talks further.
The deal also unsettled Egypt, as a naval base in North Western State of Somalia would bolster Ethiopian influence, granting them Red Sea access and undermining Cairo’s security, Nafaa explained. This is tied to Egypt’s ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD, a critical issue as Cairo’s numerous diplomatic efforts and international mediation have yielded scant progress.
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Consequently, Ethiopia dismisses Egyptian objections, terming them “baseless allegations” and insisting the dam is indispensable for its development, urging Egypt to “abandon its aggressive stance.” Tensions flared further after Ethiopia completed the dam’s fifth filling in August, escalating Cairo’s nervousness over potential disruptions to Nile water flow, which millions in Egypt depend on.
What Egypt is Concerned About
Egypt’s friction with Ethiopia over GERD isn’t the sole reason Cairo is courting Mogadishu. Somalia’s Arab League membership and religious ties align it more closely with Egypt. Beyond shared faith, Egypt has a strategic interest in Somalia, particularly in safeguarding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, vital for securing the Suez Canal’s north entrance. Major General Samir Farag elaborated that threats to this waterway from Houthi attacks have severely dented Suez Canal’s revenue, emphasizing the necessity of stability in Somalia.
“piracy concerns off Somalia’s coast also loom large, especially given recent upticks following NATO’s redeployment to Yemen,” Farag added, noting Egypt’s aim to train Somali forces against such threats, including the growing menace of al-Shabaab.
Egypt’s readiness to bolster Somalia’s army, Farag noted, is a critical move against the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab. Similar threats from ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula have propelled Egypt’s own stringent security measures, aligning with its broader strategy of countering Islamist insurgency, echoed by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s staunch positioning against threats from groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, ousted in 2013.
In a firm declaration during a January press conference with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Sisi affirmed Egypt’s protective stance over Somalia against any external threats.
“Any threat to Somalia is a threat to Egypt,” Sisi asserted, reinforcing Egypt’s commitment to its ally.
Prime Minister Ahmed’s retaliatory rhetoric during Ethiopia’s Sovereignty Day on September 8 unmistakably targeted Egypt and Somalia, cautioning of “severe retaliation” against any invasion attempts, yet stopping short of naming names.
While analysts warn of a potential proxy conflict in Somalia, Farag dismissed speculations, insisting Egypt’s aim remains diplomacy and legitimate channels, aligned with Sisi’s declaration of water security as an unyielding red line. Nevertheless, Egypt’s intensified engagement signals a decisive pivot toward African affairs, amplifying diplomatic leverage as it navigates its way out of a deep economic crisis.
Ultimately, Egypt’s actions reflect a multifaceted strategy to counter Ethiopian dominance, seek a GERD resolution, and secure critical maritime trade routes amidst regional volatility.
