Djibouti’s long-serving President Guelleh seeks sixth term after constitutional amendments
Djibouti’s president vows to run again — and the world must weigh the price of stability
When President Ismail Omar Guelleh accepted his party’s nomination this week to run for a sixth term in Djibouti’s 2026 election, he did more than announce another campaign. He formalized a trajectory that has steadily reworked the rules of governance in this tiny but strategically vital Horn of Africa nation: the removal of limits that once capped age and terms for the presidency, and the consolidation of a political order in which contest is increasingly symbolic.
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From party hall to palace: the contours of the announcement
At a special congress in the presidential palace in Djibouti City, the 77‑year‑old leader framed his decision as a response to a call from his People’s Rally for Progress (RPP) to continue “on the path of unity, stability and progress.” For many inside the ruling coalition, that message resonates. Guelleh’s two decades-plus in office have coincided with large infrastructure projects, an expanded port, and an inflow of foreign military investments that have transformed Djibouti into an outsized node in global geopolitics.
But the mechanics of his return were not left to chance. Parliament recently voted to abolish the 75‑year age cap for presidential candidates — following a 2010 revision that already removed a two‑term limit. Those legal shifts, combined with a parliament dominated by the Union for the Presidential Majority (UPM) coalition, make Guelleh’s re‑election all but certain. In 2021 he was re‑elected with 97 percent of the vote — a result dismissed by many opposition figures and international observers as neither competitive nor credible.
What Djibouti gives to the world — and what the world gives back
Strategic hub, fragile pluralism
To foreign capitals, Djibouti is extraordinarily convenient. The nation’s harbors sit at the northern edge of the Bab el‑Mandeb strait, through which a large share of global trade passes to and from the Suez Canal. Camp Lemonnier, the U.S. base, and China’s first overseas military base have become shorthand for the country’s outsized geopolitical role. Japan, France and Italy also maintain facilities here. Those relationships have brought investment, jobs and international attention; they have also made stability an overriding priority for external partners.
“Foreign governments often prioritize secure basing rights and safe shipping lanes,” said a Horn of Africa analyst who asked not to be named to speak freely. “That can create a perverse incentive structure: accessibility and predictability are rewarded even when political freedoms are constrained.”
Human rights groups have argued that Djibouti’s domestic balance has tilted strongly toward order and away from dissent. Reporters Without Borders ranks Djibouti 168th out of 180 countries on the 2025 Press Freedom Index, noting that “the media is completely controlled by the government.” Exiled opponents complain of intimidation, restricted political space, and a political class that often recycles loyalists into nominal opposition roles.
Echoes across Africa: constitutional change as a pattern
Beyond Djibouti — a broader trend
Guelleh’s maneuver is not unique on the continent. Over the past two decades several African leaders have overseen constitutional reforms that recalibrated presidential terms or age caps, enabling extended tenures in the name of stability, continuity or development. The pattern raises hard questions about the durability of democratic norms when constitutions become instruments for preserving incumbency rather than constraining it.
Supporters of such moves often point to tangible gains: highways, ports, urban renewal, and international partnerships. Djibouti’s investors and military partners will cite a predictable environment that facilitates contracts and operations. For many citizens, the calculus is immediate: will the city’s lights stay on, will wages keep flowing, will children go to school?
But the gains come with costs that are harder to quantify. When political competition is managed or muted, grievances lack a public outlet. When media are tightly controlled, accountability suffers. When political succession is uncertain or closed off, elites can become insular, and policy errors may go uncorrected.
What follows — domestic uncertainty, international ambivalence
Paths ahead for Djibouti
Domestically, Guelleh’s announcement is likely to deepen polarization. There are no large, vibrant opposition parties freely operating in Djibouti today; many critics say potential challengers are marginalized or pushed into exile. An exiled opposition activist told a regional broadcaster that the constitutional changes “strip away any remaining pretense of democratic choice.” At home, some citizens express pragmatic acceptance; others nurse quiet frustration.
Internationally, reactions will be muted and transactional. Western democracies that vocally champion human rights will still need access to bases and the safety of maritime routes. China will applaud continuity. For donors and investors, the trade‑off will be familiar: the promise of stability versus long‑term questions about governance and rights.
Questions for the global community
The Djibouti case forces a larger inquiry: are geopolitical needs reshaping how democracy promotion is practiced? When strategic priorities collide with calls for political reform, how should outside actors balance competing interests? And for Djibouti’s young population — more than half the country is under 25 — what prospects exist for political inclusion and economic opportunity if the formal levers of power remain closed?
Guelleh’s decision to run again is a reminder that power, once entrenched, can be hard to dislodge. It also illustrates a recurring global dynamic: strategic value can insulate leaders from external pressure for reform. As Djibouti prepares for 2026, the world will be watching not just who wins, but what kind of political space is left for citizens to shape their own future.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.