Somalia’s protracted political crisis has entered a new, dangerous phase. In a hastily convened session on April 12, MPs overwhelmingly endorsed a bill that would delay the election by two years, effectively extending the term of office of outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo”. The movement is an alarming escalation of a dispute that could very well turn into widespread violence unless Somalia’s political elite returns to the negotiating table.
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The opposition is said to be considering forming a parallel government; cracks are deepened in a security apparatus far divided into clan lines, and the president’s opponents have promised to resist the extension of his rule. But even if the hour is late, it is not too late for the parties to turn the course.
Somalia’s external partners, led by the African Union (AU) and supported by the United States, the UN Security Council and the European Union, should step in to organize – and lead – new talks between all stakeholders in order to draw up a roadmap for timely elections. All external actors should signal unequivocally that they are ready to impose sanctions on parties that prevent a new initiative from finding a way forward by consensus.
The mistrust that has prevented Somalia’s politicians from preparing for elections has been in full swing for the past few months. President Farmajo and leaders of Somalia’s sub-national units, known as federal member states, agreed on a framework for indirect elections on September 17, 2020.
But despite several rounds of subsequent talks, they have repeatedly failed to work out the voting system. After the end of Farmajo’s four-year term on February 8, the opposition demanded that he hand over power to an interim government led by the prime minister.
An attempt by Farmajo’s rivals to hold demonstrations to push home this point was met with deadly force with clashes between police and protesters that left at least eight people dead. Somalia’s external partners then called for talks to resolve the stalemate.
But the parties argued bitterly over the venue, the agenda and the security arrangements. When they finally met on April 3 at Mogadishu International Airport, which is guarded by AU troops, negotiations collapsed after four days.
In response, Farmajo and his supporters decided to lift the effort by convening parliament to initiate the concept of extension, which his opponents had consistently accused him of planning. During a special session convened by House Speaker Mohamed Abdirahman Mursal, MPs argued that the lack of a compromise made the September 17 agreement impossible to fulfill.
They then mandated the National Independent Electoral Commission to hold elections by universal suffrage in two years. The president signed the bill two days later.
The parliamentary decision has sent political tensions rising to levels not seen in Somalia for years – and which can snowball into violence due to two key factors. First, the de facto extension has shattered already low levels of trust among Somalia’s rival political actors. Farmajo’s opponents have rallied under the banner of the Council of Presidential Candidates, an alliance that includes two former presidents and a former prime minister.
They represent important clan districts, including in Mogadishu, and have strongly condemned the extension of Farmajo’s mandate and promised unspecified action. These opposition candidates are allied with the presidents of the federal member states of Northeastern State and Jubaland. Farmajo, for its part, enjoys the support of leaders from the federal regions of Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West.
With lines of communication cut between dueling parties and with the opposition said to be considering the formation of a parallel government, there is a high risk that the parties will use force to secure political concessions.
Second, the crisis has severely tested the cohesion of Somalia’s fragile army and police. Hours before parliament met to vote on the concept of extension, Mogadishu police chief Sadiq “John” Omar condemned what he described as a coup and ordered his men to block the entrance to the building, arguing that parliament’s term had expired. Police Commissioner Hassan Hijar Abdi immediately fired Omar and sent forces to secure the premises.
Well-placed security sources told Crisis Group that a number of soldiers from Somalia’s Turkish elite-trained Gorgor army units have since left the base and retreated to their clan strongholds. Elders from these clans also told the Crisis Group that any attempt by the authorities to disarm their troops would trigger full-scale combat. The longer the crisis lasts, the greater the danger that these divisions will grow and elevate the ghost of returning to civil war.
Resolving the crisis is not easy. Farmajo has dug in and warned external actors to stay away from Somalia’s internal affairs. The timing of the parliamentary decision – two days before the Muslim holy month of Ramadan began – was probably designed to limit the opposition’s capacity to hold demonstrations at a time when most Somalis are observing the fast.
Publicly, the opposition has reacted with restraint. Privately, however, it works to ensure that Farmajo does not get its opinion. If opposition politicians continue to form a parallel government, they will add fuel to the fire and send tensions shooting higher.
As Crisis Group has consistently advocated, there is no alternative to coordinated third-party mediation to break the election waters, given the mistrust among Somalia’s players. In the past, the disproportion of external partners to engage directly was understandable, not least because of Mogadishu’s insistence that it could mediate a compromise through Somali – led talks.
This claim no longer holds. Instead, the spiraling crisis threatens to undo all the progress made in creating a degree of political stability in Somalia over the last two decades. In addition, the political stalemate and quarrels among security forces have offered an opening for Al-Shabaab militants.
Encouraged by the partial withdrawal of Ethiopian and American troops by the end of 2020, militants have already intensified the attacks and resumed the major attacks on Somali and foreign military targets that external forces had prevented them from staging for several years. The crisis has also offered a propaganda coup for the militants, who have boasted that it confirms their portrayal of elites as power-hungry incompetents.
Somalia’s key external partners need to do more. They have shown admirable unity by rejecting the term extension, with the US, UN, AU, EU, UK and the regional bloc IGAD all making strong statements to express opposition. Now they must urge all Somali actors to resume talks. Ideally, through the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Bankole Adeoye, which has already shown interest in resolving the standoff, would mobilize external partners to intensify their diplomacy.
Firstly, with the support of key external partners, the AU should appoint an envoy who, in cooperation with the UN envoy, should meet the key parties individually and call for a return to negotiations. These envoys should especially emphasize to Farmajo that he will have to accept external mediation, as the opposition will not accept negotiations under his supervision.
To improve the chances of Farmajo changing positions, the United States could engage directly with its key supporters in Qatar and Turkey and encourage them to persuade the president to show greater flexibility given the risk posed by the crisis to Somalia’s stability.
Then, external actors must coordinate with Somalia’s political elite to call for an inclusive summit to discuss a path to elections. Convened by the AU, where the US, EU and UN act as guarantors, such a meeting should focus on delivering a time frame for elections within a few weeks rather than months.
Talks could build on the September 17 agreement, but would not necessarily be bound by it, as only a narrow section of the political elite – Farmajo and the presidents of federal member states – drafted the document. Realistically, however, any election should by and large be necessary to follow the contours of the September 17 agreement, as an indirect election is the only possible way to reconcile in today’s security environment, where Al-Shabaab controls areas in south-central Somali countryside. . Ideally, new talks would involve more participants, in particular representatives of the Council of Presidential Candidates and civil society.
In order to ensure that the parties comply with their obligations, external actors should make it clear that they are ready to impose targeted sanctions. The United States has signaled a willingness to act and urged key players to change course in response to recent developments.
The EU has also promised to take “concrete measures” if the authorities do not reverse the concept of extension. These are positive early steps. Somalia’s elites want legitimacy that comes with international recognition. Many people use foreign passports to travel, have assets outside Somalia and keep their families in the United States or EU countries. Credible threats to impose visa bans and asset freezes may well concentrate the minds.
Despite its many domestic challenges, Somalia has managed to create a degree of political stability over the last decade and a half. Most striking is that political elites have created consensus on electoral governance in previous election cycles and found a way to both hold regular votes and monitor peaceful transfers of power.
The current dead end – which can easily lead to greater violence – threatens to reveal these gains. Somalia’s elite must return to dialogue.
