International stabilisation force for Gaza is being sketched — but will it work?
Plans are under way to assemble an international stabilisation force for Gaza — a concept pushed hard in President Donald Trump’s 20-point proposal for the battered Palestinian territory. U.S. advisers say Washington will back the effort and provide as many as 200 troops in an oversight and coordination role, with roughly two dozen already staged in the region to help assemble partners. On paper, it looks like a pragmatic answer to a collapsing security environment. In practice, it raises old questions about the limits of international interventions amid unresolved political conflict.
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What is on the table
Senior U.S. advisers briefed reporters that the aim is modest: “basic stabilization of the situation,” in the advisers’ words, with a multinational force to help secure civilians and facilitate reconstruction in areas cleared of militants. The advisers said no Gazans would be forced to leave their homes, and that partners from around the world are being courted to contribute personnel.
The timing is urgent. A fragile ceasefire has seen Hamas return dozens of hostages — 20 living prisoners so far — in exchange for almost 2,000 Palestinians freed by Israel. Yet the grim work of recovering the remains of deceased hostages is slow, hindered by vast swathes of rubble and unexploded ordnance. U.S. officials acknowledged that recovering bodies will take longer than expected and discussed offering rewards for information leading to remains. Israel’s defence minister, Israel Katz, warned that Israel would resume fighting if Hamas failed to honour the deal.
Lessons from past missions
There are precedents for multinational stabilisation in the region and beyond: NATO’s KFOR in Kosovo, the U.N.’s longstanding UNIFIL deployment in Lebanon, and multilateral forces in Bosnia. Those missions show both potential and peril. They can create breathing space for diplomacy and aid to flow; they can also become fixtures that entangle external powers in local politics.
Peacekeepers work best where there is at least a political settlement to back them. Gaza has none. Hamas remains clandestine, militarised and insistent it will not disarm. Israel insists Hamas must play no role in any future government. That fundamental contradiction means any foreign force will arrive into a terrain lacking a shared political horizon.
On-the-ground realities that must be faced
Gaza is a narrow, densely populated strip of land — roughly 365 square kilometres — transformed by months of intense fighting into a landscape of collapsed apartment blocks and ruined infrastructure. The United Nations declared famine in Gaza at the end of August, a stark indicator of the humanitarian catastrophe. Aid deliveries have been restricted or cut at times, and the Rafah crossing to Egypt — Gaza’s only connection to the outside world that bypasses Israel — remains a critical choke point. UN humanitarian chief Tom Fletcher urged Israel to open all crossings immediately, saying, “It should happen now. We want it to happen immediately as part of this agreement.”
Logistics matter. Stabilisation without clear supply lines, medical supplies, fuel and a secure footprint for aid agencies risks being an empty show of intent. Moreover, the rubble itself is a hazard: unexploded ordnance and collapsed structures delay searches for bodies and block the return of displaced civilians.
Politics will shape security
Any international force’s mandate, leadership and rules of engagement will be political decisions with practical consequences. Who leads? What are the force’s objectives — stop attacks, protect civilians, oversee disarmament, or simply create secure zones for reconstruction? How will the mission handle provocations that fall short of all-out war but threaten to unravel the tenuous ceasefire?
Domestic politics in Israel and among Palestinians will colour the answer. Hardliners in Israel, notably National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, have already threatened to link aid to the return of remains and to push for a tougher line if bodies are not returned. On the Palestinian side, Hamas has said it has handed over the corpses it could access and that retrieving the rest will require “extensive efforts and special equipment.”
Who will pay and who will govern the rebuilding?
Reconstruction is central to the stabilisation pitch. Mr. Trump has touted international investment pledges to rebuild Gaza, but rebuilding is a long, expensive and politically fraught enterprise. Donors will demand transparency and guarantees that funds do not bolster militants. Gaza’s governance — and whether international architects of reconstruction can avoid empowering one local faction over another — will be contentious.
Past international aid efforts show the pitfall: money can flow into services without changing root causes. Without a political settlement that addresses governance, security and economic opportunity, reconstruction could paper over deeper fractures.
Questions that will decide the mission’s viability
- Can a multinational force operate with enough neutrality for all sides to accept it as a legitimate security guarantor?
- Who will have the lead role — the U.S., a U.N. mandate, regional states, or an ad hoc coalition — and will that choice inflame or calm local sensitivities?
- How will the mission protect civilians while avoiding being drawn into combat if provocations escalate?
- What benchmarks will be used to measure success: reductions in violence, restored aid flows, cleared areas for return, or a formal political agreement?
The idea of international stabilisation in Gaza taps into the world’s desire to stop the immediate suffering and create space for a political solution. But stability without justice risks becoming a temporary lid on a pressure cooker. External forces can hold the line — sometimes for years — but they cannot legislate the political settlement that ultimately determines whether peace sticks.
The coming weeks will test whether the international community can move beyond crisis management into a strategy that addresses security, aid, and governance in parallel. If history is any teacher, the deeper questions — who decides Gaza’s future, who pays for it, and who governs it — will be the decisive ones.
By Abdiwahab Ahmed
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
