Strategic Timing of EU and US Sanctions Against Russia in Light of the Upcoming G7 Summit
This weekend, as G7 leaders gather in Kananaskis among the stunning backdrop of the Canadian Rockies, the conversation will inevitably revolve around imposing stricter sanctions on Russia.
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The situation in Ukraine is at a critical juncture. Vladimir Putin has ramped up missile and drone assaults on Ukrainian cities, raising concerns that a new ground offensive could soon unfold.
Despite President Donald Trump’s visible frustration with Putin’s ongoing attacks on civilians, his administration has been slow to implement a firmer stance.
In the coming days, pivotal events such as a NATO summit in The Hague and a meeting of EU leaders in Brussels will likely shed light on Trump’s outlook regarding Ukraine and the larger concerns of European security.
There’s a growing belief that while Russia’s economy has weathered sanctions better than anticipated, it could be surprisingly vulnerable underneath the surface.
This week, the European Commission introduced its 18th sanctions package, which seeks to halt the flow of refined Russian crude oil into Europe, while also advocating for a lower oil price cap agreed upon by the G7. In July, an outright phase-out of Russian fossil fuels, particularly LNG, is also expected to be proposed.
Simultaneously, U.S. Senators Lindsey Graham (Rep) and Richard Blumenthal (Dem) are championing a bill designed to exert what they describe as “bone-crushing” pressure on Russia by imposing a staggering 500% tariff on countries that continue purchasing its oil.
However, both initiatives face significant hurdles.
The price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil was set at $60 per barrel in a joint decision by G7 and EU member states last December. The aim was to avoid a complete ban that would harm the global south and significantly increase prices, which would benefit the Kremlin. The strategy seeks to keep oil flowing while diminishing profits for Russia.
To navigate around this price cap, Russia commenced acquiring end-of-life vessels, thereby creating a “shadow fleet.” The West’s dominance in maritime insurance has enabled the enforcement of this cap, contributing to a growing reluctance among ports to allow these tankers to dock.
Experts indicate that despite still generating one-third of its export revenues from crude oil, Russia continues to find ways to bypass these restrictions.
The EU estimates that it has successfully curtailed Russian oil revenues, particularly as India, Turkey, and China have pressured Moscow to lower its crude prices. Presently, as crude trades around $65 a barrel due to various geopolitical developments, the existing $60 cap has lost its effectiveness.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently proposed cutting this cap to $45, with the timing of the proposal aimed squarely at the upcoming G7 summit. Europe is clear about needing collective action.
While EU officials believe most G7 partners are aligned, there remains skepticism surrounding the Trump administration’s position. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has shown hesitance, previously urging against a mention of a lower price cap in recent communications.
Ongoing discussions suggest that while efforts to persuade Trump will persist, the other six G7 nations might simply proceed unilaterally, with the UK and EU managing a considerable share of oil-related elements.
The EU’s strategy also includes a ban on transactions involving EU operators and the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, alongside measures to limit Russian crude entering member states through backdoor routes, often after being refined and relabeled.
Accurate data on how much relabeled Russian crude—predominantly refined in India and Turkey—reaches Europe is insufficient, with conflicting reports complicating matters.
According to LSEG data, during the first quarter of 2025, India and Turkey imported 1.7 million barrels per day of Russian crude, with EU member states sourcing over 350,000 barrels from these countries during the same timeframe.
EU officials assert that the burden of proof should shift to exporting countries, compelling them to demonstrate that the refined oil is not of Russian origin—a challenging task given the blending of different crude types.
In response to these sanctions, the Kremlin appears unfazed. Dmitry Peskov, spokesperson for Putin, recently remarked, “Russia has not been living under restrictions for just a day… We have substantial experience that allows us to minimize the adverse effects of such measures.”
The European Commission is also considering cutting off an additional 22 Russian banks from the SWIFT international payments system and converting current financial restrictions into a blanket ban.
This comprehensive sanctions package may be ratified by the end of the month, though Hungary and Slovakia’s potential objections could pose a challenge.
Slovakia’s Prime Minister, Robert Fico, has issued a warning that he will not support the sanctions package without assurance regarding solutions for problems arising from the complete phase-out of Russian fuels.
The conflicting responses from the Trump administration regarding the Ukraine War have, in many ways, spurred the EU into introducing what could become its most stringent sanctions to date.
During a meeting in Kyiv on 10 May, leaders from Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany, and Poland urged Russia—expecting U.S. backing—to agree to an immediate 30-day ceasefire or face severe sanctions. Instead, Trump supported Putin’s call for talks in Istanbul the following week, which resulted in intensified Russian attacks and no commitment to a ceasefire.
Moscow seems to believe that achieving military gains and undermining Ukrainian morale represents a more favorable strategy than entering ceasefire discussions.
As Svitlana Taran, an analyst with the European Policy Centre, noted, “The aim of the [18th sanctions] package is to increase pressure on Russia and to compel negotiations conducted with sincere intentions.” She elaborated, stating that “Russia is engaging in negotiations but lacks any genuine intent to negotiate, as they still believe they can win.”
With the Biden administration’s reluctance to take stringent actions against Russia’s energy sector until recently, Washington seems to be adjusting its approach amidst the mounting frustration regarding Russia’s relentless targeting of civilians.
Though European nations that depend on Russian oil find themselves caught up in potential U.S. tariffs, Senator Graham emphasizes that there will be exemptions for countries that support Ukraine’s defense efforts.
A strong bipartisan response from Congress could provide Trump with a “good-cop-bad-cop” strategy in his dealings with Putin, although he is often lenient towards the Russian President.
Brussels, while eager to collaborate with Washington, might reflect on the EU’s 2009 oil embargo on Iran, which ultimately drove the country toward the negotiating table concerning its nuclear program. As Edward Fishman, a former Obama administration official, stated, “Major new EU sanctions on Russia could do the same today, prompting Washington to follow suit.”
In navigating these complex dynamics, it’s clear that the coming weeks will be critical in shaping responses to the ongoing conflict and its broader implications for global security.
Edited By Ali Musa
Axadle Times International – Monitoring.