Nigeria’s Refinery Crisis: A Closer Look

The recent shutdown of the Warri Refinery—barely a month after it was declared operational—has ignited a firestorm of concern regarding the management and oversight of Nigeria’s oil sector. How can a facility that absorbed nearly $900 million in maintenance costs cease operations so soon after opening its doors? It’s a question that has left industry experts scratching their heads and citizens questioning the transparency of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Limited (NNPCL).

A document released by the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority, obtained by The Punch, sheds light on this troubling situation. The Warri Refinery was expected to produce Premium Motor Spirit (petrol), yet it did not deliver even a drop before its abrupt shutdown. The declaration of operational status by former NNPC Group CEO Mele Kyari now seems more farcical than celebratory.

The Disappointment Deepens

Industry operators and experts alike are disheartened by this setback. The Port Harcourt Refining Company, which resumed operations in November 2024, is reported to be functioning at less than 40% of its capacity. How can a country so rich in oil resources continue to struggle to refine its own products? It feels like a cruel joke—one that keeps getting played on the Nigerian people.

Despite substantial investment and rehabilitation initiatives aimed at revitalizing these refineries, operational challenges loom large, casting a shadow on their potential. Imagine a race car sitting in the garage, primed and ready, yet it never leaves the starting line. This analogy captures the frustration that has come to characterize Nigeria’s refinery sector.

A Historical Perspective

Commissioned in 1978, the Warri Refinery was designed with noble ambitions: to serve the southern and southwestern markets of Nigeria. It boasts a petrochemical plant capable of producing 13,000 metric tons of polypropylene and 18,000 metric tons of carbon black annually. This is not just a piece of machinery; it represents years of investment, innovation, and hope. Yet, it fell victim to the very issues that have plagued Nigeria’s oil sector for decades—neglect, mismanagement, and, yes, even corruption.

I remember speaking to a local worker at the refinery during its last operational day, his eyes filled with a mix of hope and despair. “We just want to work,” he said. “We want to contribute to our country.” This sentiment echoes profoundly in a nation that has the capability to be self-sufficient in petroleum but is continually thwarted by systemic failures.

Revamp Efforts Hit a Wall

The government’s attempts to rehabilitate the Port Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna refineries aimed at reducing dependency on imported petroleum products and boosting domestic refining capacity. However, it seems that the road to recovery is both long and winding. Recent developments have cast a shadow over any optimism; it’s almost as if we are trapped in a loop of history repeating itself.

With the emergence of private sector investments like the Dangote Refinery, one could argue that a glimmer of hope appeared on the horizon. Could this be the game changer that Nigeria desperately needs? Perhaps, but as one must learn from past experience, a spark can only ignite a fire if the conditions are right.

The NMDPRA’s document details how the Warri Refinery was shut down on January 25, 2025, due to safety concerns related to its Crude Distillation Unit Main Heater. The juxtaposition of this closure against the backdrop of the facility’s recent operational status raises serious questions about the NNPCL’s oversight and operational standards.

The Numbers Don’t Lie

Meanwhile, the Port Harcourt Refinery, which resumed operations two months earlier, is functioning at a woeful 37.87% of its installed capacity. This stark reality contradicts the more optimistic claims made by NNPC spokesperson Femi Soneye, who reported better figures.

The refinery has a nameplate capacity of 60,000 barrels per day, yet it produced only 82.55 million litres of refined products monthly between November 2024 and April 2025. When we compare this to its optimal output of 218 million litres, it raises the question: what is going wrong with our processes? How long can we continue to mismanage these invaluable assets?

Initially, the rehabilitation project—funded through loans backed by international financial institutions—was designed to restore the refinery to its prime operational capacity. Yet, the ongoing issues suggest that this much-anticipated turnaround may remain just that—a dream unfulfilled.

In a country where the potential for greatness exists, these ongoing operational challenges are not just bureaucratic failures; they are violations of trust. The Nigerian populace deserves better, and it is high time that we hold our leaders accountable for the mismanagement of our natural resources.