Villa Somalia’s Political Miscalculation in Northeastern State: A Strategy Unraveled

EDITORIAL | The landscape of Somali politics is as dynamic as it is complex, with Villa Somalia often balancing the challenge of uniting a divided nation while exerting centralized influence. Recently, however, an ambitious attempt to integrate the regions of Sanaag and Haylaan into the emergent Khaatumo administration has faced a startling setback. This move has unearthed deep-seated resistance in Northeastern State and demonstrated a significant miscalculation of local allegiances.

The withdrawal of North Western State of Somalia forces from Laascaanood marked a pivotal moment, empowering the people of Sool and Cayn to chart their own political course. Guided by their traditional leaders, the Garaads, these communities declared the formation of a transitional local authority—SSC-Khaatumo—to advocate for their historically neglected regions.

Northeastern State initially offered a cautious nod of support to this movement. For over a decade, the people of Northeastern State have stood in solidarity with Sool and Cayn, opposing North Western State of Somalia’s military interventions. The bond they share is more than just clan lineage; it is enshrined in constitutional ties. As long as Khaatumo remained within the wider Northeastern State political fold, there appeared to be no objections.

However, the grassroots initiative intended to resist external domination soon sought a different course. The Khaatumo leadership began to lean towards Mogadishu, seeking formal federal recognition as an independent member state—thereby implicitly challenging Northeastern State’s historical ties and established administrative relations with the regions. Villa Somalia, seeing an opportunity, eagerly engaged to capitalize on the momentum.

During a recent National Consultative Council (NCC) meeting, conspicuously boycotted by Northeastern State and Jubaland, the federal leadership, spearheaded by Prime Minister Hamza Barre, gave their backing to the idea of SSC-Khaatumo as a new federal member state. The Ministry of Interior received the task of facilitating a “founding conference” to inaugurate the administration.

This plan appeared to be a strategic move by Villa Somalia to dilute Northeastern State’s sway within the federal framework. For observers attuned to federal-state tensions, this seemed a transparent attempt to fracture Northeastern State’s territorial integrity, thereby diminishing its influence in forthcoming national dialogues.

In pursuit of this goal, Villa Somalia deployed political operatives hailing from Sanaag and Haylaan—most notably former Northeastern State parliament speaker Cabdirashid Yuusuf Jibriil, now a federal MP—to galvanize support for SSC-Khaatumo in their regions. Jibriil’s visit to Ceelbuh, ostensibly under the banner of Garowe but pursuing divergent aims, met with resistance. Northeastern State’s security forces promptly acted to prevent any parallel mobilization.

Concurrently, federal ministers and lawmakers from Haylaan and Sanaag undertook preparations in Laascaanood, poised to extend their efforts to adjoining districts contingent on Jibriil’s success.

Yet, it was not a party’s influence or military directive that thwarted the plan—it was tradition itself. The elders from Sanaag and Haylaan, spearheaded by Sultan Siciid Sultan Cabdisalaan, publicly restated their stance. The Sultan’s declaration, shared by himself, dissociated them from the SSC-Khaatumo venture in Laascaanood and reaffirmed their allegiance to Northeastern State.

This pronouncement dealt a blow to Villa Somalia’s scheme.

This editorial isn’t about refuting the rights of Sool and Cayn’s residents to seek representation or security. It does, however, question the federal government’s methodologies. By bypassing regional leadership, sowing division, and attempting to orchestrate political realignment through select actors, Villa Somalia risks destabilizing the federalism framework it purports to support.

The intentions were clear: fragment Northeastern State’s control, establish a new federal entity loyal to Villa Somalia, and, in so doing, offer politicians a route to federal parliamentary seats in the impending elections. What went unnoticed—yet was crucially underestimated—was the deeply rooted social contract binding Northeastern State and its communities.

What Lies Ahead?

Some anticipate that traditional leaders from Sool and Cayn may soon elucidate their positions—either by dissociating from SSC-Khaatumo’s Mogadishu leanings or by formalizing its autonomy. Others worry that Villa Somalia might press on with the conference despite the public rebuff from Sanaag and Haylaan.

Certainly, the unraveling of this maneuver sheds light not only on a failed political strategy but also on the constraints of federal centralization. It underscores Northeastern State’s internal resilience and highlights the enduring power of local legitimacy in the political arena of Somalia.

Edited By Ali Musa
Axadle Times International–Monitoring.