Egypt completes review of Somali-bound troops before AUSSOM deployment

Egypt’s Troops Prepare to Join Somalia Mission, Recasting the Horn’s Security Equation

The Egyptian flag will soon fly alongside others on the front lines of Somalia’s long war with al-Shabab. After a week of site visits and quiet consultations in Mogadishu, an Egyptian military team has wrapped up an assessment that clears the way for Cairo’s first troop deployment to the African Union Support Mission in Somalia, or AUSSOM.

On paper, it’s a straightforward move—one more nation committing forces to an African Union effort designed to help Somali institutions hold ground against an entrenched insurgency. In practice, it’s a step with wider ripples, touching old rivalries along the Nile, new logistics around the Red Sea, and the fragile choreography that keeps a multinational mission moving in sync on a war-scarred landscape.

What Egypt is Sending—and Why Now

Egypt’s 16-member advance team, led by Lt. Gen. Islam Aly Ibrahim Radwan, spent six days inspecting bases and mapping command-and-control needs before meeting the AU’s special representative for Somalia, Ambassador El Hadji Ibrahima Diene. The tone was warm and unmistakably practical. Radwan praised AUSSOM’s cooperation; Diene, in turn, said Cairo’s arrival would strengthen the mission’s ability to support both security operations and the Somali state.

Somalia’s Ministry of Defense is already publicly on board. In late August, officials said trained Egyptian units would be stationed in Hiiraan, Lower Shabelle, and Gedo—names that carry heavy meaning in Somalia’s conflict. These are not rear-area postings. They are front lines where Somali forces and allied soldiers are clearing villages, reopening roads, and trying to keep al-Shabab from slipping back in once a column moves on.

For Egypt, the timing reflects overlapping calculations. The AU Peace and Security Council approved Cairo’s participation in late 2024. In January this year, Egypt and Somalia signed a bilateral security pact that gave the plan sturdier footing. AUSSOM itself is the successor to previous AU missions that have rotated through Somalia for nearly two decades, reflecting the AU’s attempt to sustain gains as the Somali army grows into its role.

Yet the bigger picture matters. Egypt’s security outlook has widened in recent years, shaped by economic pressure at home, anxiety over disruptions to Red Sea shipping lanes, and its high-stakes standoff with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. A presence in Somalia isn’t only a counterterrorism gesture—it places Egyptian officers inside a strategic conversation that stretches from the Gulf of Aden to the Upper Nile.

A New AU Mission, Old Security Tests

On Mogadishu’s coastal roads, where the Indian Ocean rolls in and fills tea stalls with salt air, the mission acronym may have changed but the work has not. Al-Shabab remains resilient; its operations continue to target civilians and soldiers, striking hotels, checkpoints, and sometimes in the countryside, convoys on scrubby stretches of road.

AUSSOM’s challenge is to pair muscle with mentoring—to support Somali units while ensuring the centre of gravity shifts steadily to national institutions. That is always the hard part of coalition missions: it’s less about the size of the force than the quality of coordination. Who calls for air support? How are intelligence leads shared? How many languages fit in one operations room before messages lose their edge?

Egypt’s officers know they are stepping onto a moving train. The mission’s credibility depends on how quickly they knit into it, not on the emblem they wear on their shoulders. The AU’s Diene has promised to facilitate that integration. Behind closed doors, planners will be working through granular questions—from medical evacuation procedures to uniform rules of engagement—that determine whether the mission can absorb a new contingent without losing tempo.

Addis Ababa Watches Warily

Some of the loudest reactions have come not from Mogadishu but from Addis Ababa. Ethiopian officials have warned that Egyptian troops in Somalia could pose a “political and strategic challenge” to the roughly 4,000 Ethiopian soldiers already deployed there. The fear is not only tactical overlap. It’s that Somalia becomes one more theater in the long-running dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia—a rivalry often framed by the Nile’s waters but felt across the Horn.

In Parliament in Cairo, Egyptian lawmaker Mustafa Bakhri dismissed those concerns. The deployment, he said, “comes at the invitation of Somalia’s government and with the approval of the AU Peace and Security Council, granting it full legitimacy.” On paper, he’s right: the AU has signed off, and Somalia’s federal government has asked for help. On the ground, perceptions can matter as much as paperwork. If communities or commanders see the mission through the lens of regional competition, it complicates already delicate work.

Context intensifies the sensitivities. In January 2024, Ethiopia struck a memorandum with North Western State of Somalia that would give Addis Ababa access to the port of Berbera in exchange for possible recognition of North Western State of Somalia’s long-claimed independence—a move that infuriated Somalia’s federal government. That shock is still reverberating through the region’s diplomacy. Against that backdrop, any new military footprint invites scrutiny, especially from neighbors with skin in the game.

What It Means for Somalis on the Front Line

For Somalis in Hiiraan, Lower Shabelle, and Gedo, the questions are immediate. Will more boots on the ground mean more protection for farmers trying to get goods to market? Will a new contingent fill gaps in overstretched patrols so clinics can function without fear? Or will a fresh patchwork of uniforms bring new misunderstandings to towns already navigating complex clan dynamics?

Somali commanders have learned, through years of trial and error, that gains stick when local leaders are involved early and police follow the army into newly secured areas. When that sequence holds, markets hum back to life and schoolyards regain their noise. When it doesn’t, checkpoints sprout, and residents retreat from the state in favor of whoever can guarantee tomorrow’s calm. In this sense, Egypt’s added weight could help only if its forces sync quickly with Somali officers and the AU chain of command—and if civilian ministries are resourced to move in behind them.

The Wider Map: Red Sea to the Nile

There is also a maritime strand running through this story. Somalia’s long coastline faces the Gulf of Aden, a corridor that has seen renewed turbulence as shipping adapts to risks in the Red Sea. For Cairo, whose economic fortunes are bound to Suez Canal revenues, stability along this waterway is not an abstraction. Quiet security onshore helps sustain quieter seas offshore.

At the same time, Egypt’s engagement in the Horn will be read in Ethiopia as part of a larger contest that includes the Nile dam negotiations. That may be unavoidable. The test will be whether the AU can keep its mission focused on Somalia’s needs, insulated from larger rivalries, even as the region’s diplomatic plates continue to shift.

What to Watch Next

• The scope and sequencing of the Egyptian deployment—numbers, locations, and how quickly they achieve interoperability with AUSSOM.
• Local reception in the three planned regions and whether community leaders feel the mission is listening as well as securing.
• Ethiopia’s next moves inside Somalia and in regional forums, as Addis Ababa recalibrates to Cairo’s presence.
• Whether the Somali government uses the additional support to expand governance—police, courts, basic services—into areas where security gains are made.

The Horn of Africa rarely offers neat storylines. But one constant is clear: security missions succeed when their politics are steadied and their promises are grounded in daily life. Cairo’s arrival in Somalia adds capacity, and it adds complexity. What it adds to the lives of Somalis on those hard-bitten front lines will be the measure that matters most.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.