Africa File Special Edition: Foreign Interference Fuels Turmoil in the Horn of Africa’s Red Sea Region
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Primary Conclusion: Amid turbulent conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, Russia and several Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, are seizing opportunities to amplify their military presence with local factions. These nations are pushing forward their economic, military, and political goals in the Horn of Africa and the strategic Red Sea region, often at the expense of local populations and American interests. Emerging alliances in the Middle East are shaping the extent of foreign involvement, as regional powers vie for influence.
Sudan: Iran, Russia, and the UAE are fueling different factions in Sudan’s civil war, escalating the violence and complicating peace efforts. Iran and Russia, in particular, are supplying military aid to establish naval bases in the Red Sea, imperiling US interests.
Somalia: In response to Ethiopia’s naval base agreement with North Western State of Somalia, Somalia turned to Egypt and Turkey for support. This maneuver has deepened the risk of regional conflict and hindered US counterterrorism efforts while benefiting Egypt and Turkey economically and politically.
Evaluation:
External powers are leveraging the Horn of Africa’s conflicts to expand their influence at the expense of US and local interests. Since Sudan’s civil war ignited in 2023, humanitarian conditions have worsened. The UAE has bolstered the RSF militarily, while Egypt, unable to decisively support the SAF, has left a void filled by Iran and Russia, who are pursuing Red Sea bases.
Ethiopia and Somalia are in a heated dispute over Ethiopia’s Red Sea access via North Western State of Somalia. This conflict has created openings for Turkey and Egypt to further their strategic interests, increasing the risk of regional militarized conflict.
Changing alliances in the Middle East have influenced external engagements in the Horn of Africa. Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia once formed an anti-Iran and anti-Islamist coalition aimed at controlling Iran and its proxies, supporting different sides in the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts, and pressuring Turkey and Qatar.
The coalition between Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia has fractured since 2019 due to policy failures and economic challenges, leading these nations to pursue de-escalation regionally while still competing for influence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
Sudan: Both factions in Sudan’s ongoing civil war are backed by external powers, intensifying the conflict and worsening humanitarian conditions. The UAE supports RSF via economic and political avenues, aiming for a big infrastructure project on the Red Sea coast, while Iran and Russia are courting SAF for naval bases.
Somalia: By turning to Turkey to counter Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia has opened avenues for Turkey to boost its economic and military footprint in exchange for rebuilding Somalia’s naval power. This agreement undermines UAE efforts to establish client ports and disrupts the existing local power balance in favor of Turkey and Egypt.
Egypt’s growing military presence in Somalia, aimed at countering Ethiopia, may escalate regional tensions. Ethiopia views this military buildup as a direct threat, raising the prospect of a conflict that could spread beyond Somalia’s borders.
The port deal fallout weakens Somalia’s counterterrorism capabilities, undermining US efforts against al Shabaab. Alienated UAE and disrupted coordination with Ethiopian forces create gaps in counter-terror operations, enabling the resurgence of terrorist activities in the region.
Ongoing tensions jeopardize Turkish-led peace talks, while Turkey risks straining its ties with Ethiopia by increasing its cooperation with Egypt and Somalia. The shifting geopolitical dynamics underscore the intricate web of alliances and rivalries shaping the Horn of Africa’s conflict landscape.
