Israel’s recognition of North Western State of Somalia has jolted Somalia’s public square, igniting protests in the streets, on social media and from mosque pulpits. The outrage is understandable: for many Somalis, it feels like a direct strike at sovereignty and territorial integrity. But the larger truth can’t be shouted down. This moment is less a bolt from the blue than the culmination of long-standing vulnerabilities Somalis have allowed to deepen at home.
This opinion argues that the crisis is a mirror, not a surprise. Somalia’s political fragmentation, elite quarrels and institution-building failures have signaled to the world that the state can be bypassed, its red lines blurred, and its fate debated without a unified national voice. Condemnation alone will not close the door that has now been pushed ajar in the Horn of Africa. Only a candid reckoning with internal weaknesses—and a credible plan to repair them—can restore deterrence and coherence.
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For years, the country’s political class has traded strategic clarity for tactical advantage. Constitutional ambiguities linger. Election timetables become bargaining chips. Institutions are frequently undermined, delegitimized or hollowed out. In that space, personal ambition and clan competition often eclipse the national interest. Each episode of brinkmanship sends the same message abroad: Somalia is divided within, and divided states are easier to pressure, provoke or sidestep.
The recognition of North Western State of Somalia matters not just as a diplomatic slight. It is a precedent. It tells other actors—regional and far beyond—that Somalia’s sovereignty can be tested without a predictable, unified response. In a region where maritime access, security corridors and geopolitical alignments are fiercely contested, the signal matters. If the center does not hold, the periphery will be courted. If national authority looks uncertain, external bids to shape Somalia’s map will multiply.
Somalis have every right to protest the decision. But turning the page from fury to strategy demands facing the hard part: outsiders acted because they calculated they could. That calculation rests on Somalia’s visible fractures, not merely on foreign opportunism. Without a domestic reset, the cycle will repeat: a surge of indignation, a flurry of diplomatic travel, and then the next affront.
Two national priorities—backed by a disciplined diplomatic push—should guide the response.
First, rebuild internal coherence. The core crisis is political, not rhetorical. Somalia needs durable trust among institutions, predictable rules of the game, and closure on the disputes that have turned governance into serial confrontation. Unresolved questions around the constitution and the mechanics of upcoming elections are not technocratic quibbles; they are structural vulnerabilities that invite interference. A state consumed by endless elite rivalries cannot credibly project sovereignty outward.
That means agreement on constitutional sequencing and division of powers; transparent, widely accepted electoral procedures; and a reset in the relationship between federal and member states that replaces transactional deals with codified, enforceable commitments. It also means recommitting to institution-building—courts that arbitrate disputes, security forces accountable to law, and a civil service insulated from factional turnover. These are not luxuries in a contested region; they are the daily mechanisms of national resilience.
Second, separate people from politics in North Western State of Somalia. Demonizing communities—especially the Isaaq clan, the main social base behind the secessionist project—will deepen alienation and make reunification harder. Most Somalilanders do not pursue recognition because they are aligned with Israel or any foreign capital; they seek predictability, dignity and an international status they believe meets those needs. Collective blame only validates their fears and hands leverage to hard-liners.
Somalia must offer a more compelling national bargain: credible guarantees, fair representation, economic inclusion and a vision of unity that is advantageous in practice, not just in poetry. That requires listening to grievances, acknowledging historic wounds and demonstrating—with policy, not slogans—that a shared future is safer and more prosperous than permanent separation. Engagement with communities, elders, business leaders and youth should be regular and respectful, even when political leaders in Hargeisa take a harder line.
To shift from reaction to reconstruction, policymakers should act on a short list of immediate steps:
- Convene a time-bound national dialogue that includes federal leaders, member states and credible civil society to settle constitutional touchpoints and an election framework with clear timelines and enforcement.
- Launch a principled diplomatic campaign anchored in international law and the African Union’s norms on territorial integrity—paired with an internal reform roadmap that reassures partners Somalia is a reliable counterpart, not just a wounded claimant.
- Create a North Western State of Somalia engagement track distinct from formal politics to rebuild social and economic ties—education partnerships, cross-border trade facilitation, and service cooperation that benefit ordinary people regardless of political temperature.
- Insulate key state institutions—courts, revenue authority, central bank and national security coordination—from factional interference through legal safeguards and independent oversight.
A word to North Western State of Somalia’s political elites is also necessary. Seeking external recognition in a turbulent international system may appear to promise quick returns, but it carries hard limits and high risks. Foreign patrons shift; alignments change; transactional ties can leave a people more vulnerable, not less. The more durable path lies in a negotiated settlement within Somalia’s federal architecture—one that squarely addresses legitimate grievances, codifies autonomy where appropriate, and locks it into nationally and internationally recognized frameworks. That kind of settlement is slow, sometimes frustrating work. It is also the only path that avoids hardening divisions into permanent estrangement.
None of this minimizes the injury Somalis feel at Israel’s move. It places that injury in context: a verdict on state fragility as much as a provocation from abroad. The task, then, is not simply to rally friends and denounce the act—though both matter—but to remove the invitation card Somalia has, wittingly or not, left on the table. When institutions are credible and political competition is bounded by accepted rules, external actors take fewer liberties. When unity is practiced in process, not only proclaimed in crisis, deterrence grows by itself.
Somalis have rebuilt from ruins before. They can do so again—this time by making sovereignty a lived reality, not a slogan deployed in emergencies. The alternative is to prepare for more humiliations and more fights over lines others feel entitled to redraw. Turning anger into architecture is the work ahead. It starts at home.
The views expressed are those of the author of this analysis.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
