Europe is bringing back the citizen-soldier. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, a growing number of European governments have moved to reintroduce conscription or expand voluntary national service, reversing three decades of reliance on smaller, professional armies. Germany and France are the latest to join the shift, betting that wider training for young adults is the fastest way to rebuild reserves, harden deterrence and prepare for a long era of insecurity.
The trend marks a significant recalibration. After the Cold War, most European countries downsized and professionalized their forces, prioritizing expeditionary missions over territorial defense. The war in Ukraine forced a reckoning: Would Europe have the mass, logistics and mobilization systems to defend its own territory if conflict spread? The answer increasingly rests on new pipelines of trained reservists and a broader concept of national readiness.
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Germany’s pivot is emblematic. The Bundestag on Dec. 5 approved a “voluntary conscription” system designed to swell the Bundeswehr’s ranks and rebuild a deep reserve. Beginning next year, all 18-year-old men will complete a digital questionnaire about their willingness to serve and undergo a medical exam. Those selected may volunteer for six to 11 months, receiving about €2,600 a month, with bonuses for extended service. After the initial stint, recruits transition into the reserve.
Berlin’s targets are ambitious: grow from roughly 184,000 personnel and 60,000 reservists to 260,000 full-time troops and 200,000 reservists by 2035. The law also leaves the door open to a broader compulsory draft if security conditions worsen or recruitment falls short. That prospect has already stirred opposition, with thousands of students protesting in several cities after the vote.
France is taking a similar path, reviving national service two decades after ending conscription. President Emmanuel Macron on Nov. 27 announced a voluntary model for 18- and 19-year-olds, requiring 10 months in a military unit. Paris hopes to reach 10,000 volunteers a year by 2030, with recruits paid €800 a month. “At a time when all our European allies are moving forward in the face of a threat that weighs on us all, France cannot stand still,” Macron said.
Other governments have moved in the same direction. Belgium this year outlined a voluntary service track for 18-year-olds, following the Netherlands’ steps in 2023. In the north, several states had already reversed course earlier. Lithuania reinstated conscription in 2015, a year after Russia seized Crimea; Sweden brought back a selective draft in 2017 that applies to men and women.
Sweden’s model, copied in part by Germany, screens every 18-year-old through an online questionnaire, physical tests and interviews, then calls up the most suitable. Fewer than 10% are conscripted in a typical year. In 2023, about 7,000 Swedes served nine to 15 months, feeding a reserve that can be mobilized quickly.
Finland, now a NATO member alongside Sweden, never abandoned the draft. All Finnish men serve six to 12 months at 18, then remain in the reserve until 50; in a crisis, Helsinki can mobilize up to 280,000 trained reservists. Denmark last year extended the draft to include women, who can serve up to 11 months, and Norway’s gender-neutral conscription can run to 19 months.
The Baltic states are rebuilding mass as well. Latvia reintroduced conscription for young men in 2023 after a 16-year pause and plans to extend the draft to women in 2028. Estonia, which has maintained conscription since independence in 1991, requires men ages 18 to 26 to serve 11 months. Many Estonians view the obligation as essential to national survival, and the country’s 40,000-strong reserve forms the backbone of its wartime force.
Poland, which ended conscription in 2008, has held off from reviving the draft but is converging on the same goal of broader preparedness. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government launched a nationwide training program last month for adult citizens, offering courses from one to 30 days that cover basic military skills, survival and first aid. Warsaw aims to train 100,000 people in 2027 and build an eventual force of 500,000 including reservists. Public sentiment is fluid: a late-November poll by Wirtualna Polska found 59% support for bringing back compulsory service, though other recent surveys put support closer to 40%.
Not everyone is moving in lockstep. The United Kingdom, one of Europe’s two nuclear powers, has no plans to reinstate national service 65 years after abolishing it; a voluntary scheme floated ahead of last year’s general election faded after Labour returned to power. Ireland and Malta, both militarily neutral, have no history of conscription and are unlikely to change. Italy and Spain maintain large professional armies, though Italy’s defense minister recently floated creating a voluntary service option akin to the French and German models.
Several forces are driving Europe’s partial return to conscription. Geography matters: the closer a country is to Russia, the greater the perceived need for mass mobilization, local resilience and rapid reinforcement. Demographics matter too: tight labor markets and aging populations make recruiting and retaining professional soldiers more difficult and expensive. Defense budgets are rising, and the process accelerated this year with the return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House, sharpening European debates about self-reliance within NATO.
The new models reflect a balancing act. Governments want to expand the pool of trained citizens without imposing blanket compulsion that could trigger a political backlash. Sweden’s selective approach and Germany’s digital screening aim to target motivated, capable recruits while keeping options open to scale up. Pay varies widely—Germany at €2,600 a month versus France at €800—raising questions of equity and competition with civilian employment. Gender policies are uneven, with the Nordics furthest along in integrating women into compulsory or selective service.
The strategic bet is that broader training will rebuild the logistics, command depth and mobilization muscle memory lost in the post–Cold War drawdown. Reservists are cheaper to maintain than active-duty forces and can be called up quickly in emergencies. Civilian training programs, like Poland’s, also bolster societal resilience by spreading basic skills in first aid, navigation and survival that matter in crises ranging from cyberattacks to natural disasters.
But risks and tradeoffs loom. Conscription can strain universities and employers, and pay disparities may deter lower-income recruits or spark resentment. Protests in Germany suggest that any shift toward compulsory service will face scrutiny over fairness, conscientious objection and the quality of training. Administratively, militaries must expand barracks, instructors and equipment stockpiles to absorb larger cohorts without diluting standards.
Two years into the war next door, however, a broad picture has emerged. On NATO’s eastern flank and in the Nordics, conscription—in various guises—is back and likely to endure. Farther west and south, professional forces remain the norm, but voluntary service schemes are gaining political traction as an insurance policy. Europe is rebuilding mass, one cohort at a time, searching for a sustainable balance between professional expertise and citizen commitment in an age when deterrence once again depends on the credible ability to mobilize at scale.
By Abdiwahab Ahmed
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
