Somalia’s army in pieces: Cowsweyne defeat still reverberates, former president warns
When Al-Shabaab overran Cowsweyne in 2023, it did more than seize a strategic town in central Somalia. The militants’ victory cracked open the fragile architecture of the Somali National Army (SNA), scattering frontline units, exposing command fractures and — according to former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed — setting back efforts to rebuild a professional force for years.
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A rout with consequences
“Osweyne was where Somali forces were destroyed,” Sharif told reporters, using an alternate spelling of the town. The numbers still vary: Al-Shabaab’s media put the death toll at 178, government figures cited about 130, the majority of them soldiers. Militants carried off vehicles, weapons and prisoners. In the days that followed, shaken SNA contingents abandoned a string of towns in Galmudug — El Dheer, Masagaway, Gal’ad and Budbud — handing back terrain they had won only weeks earlier.
That collapse, Sharif argues, ruptured the army’s command chain. Reconstituting it has been “a tall order,” he says, and one made harder by what he describes as the government’s misplaced priorities: a push for one-sided constitutional changes that distracted public attention, and a turn toward arming clan militias rather than rebuilding national forces.
Signs of institutional decline
Analysts say the episode illustrated enduring problems inside Somalia’s security sector: factional loyalties, uneven training, and chronic corruption. International partners have been crucial in propping up Somalia’s defensive capacity over the past decade, but those relationships have been frayed. US Africa Command, which helped create and train the Danab special forces — an elite SNA contingent widely credited with some of the government’s limited battlefield gains — reportedly pulled back from training arrangements amid allegations of corruption within Somali security leadership.
The result is a dangerous vacuum: an army that is under-resourced and under-unified, militia actors that are being armed to plug gaps, and militants that continue to test government control. In recent weeks, government troops have suffered further setbacks in Moqokori, Adan Yabaal and Mahas, reinforcing the perception that gains against Al-Shabaab can be ephemeral.
Why arming militias is a risky bet
Across fragile states, the short-term logic of using local militias to hold ground is familiar. They know the terrain, speak the dialects and can mobilize quickly. But Sharif and other critics warn that arming militias risks undermining Somalia’s already tenuous sovereignty and eroding the very institutions needed to build a durable state.
“If you replace a national army with armed clan groups, you are substituting rule-of-law with informal power structures,” said a Somali security analyst who asked not to be named for safety reasons. “Today’s militia ally can become tomorrow’s regional warlord.”
Somalia’s political landscape — a patchwork of federal member states, sub-clan networks and a central government with limited reach — makes central command and oversight extraordinarily difficult. The constitutional debates that have consumed Mogadishu recently have added to the strain, diverting political energy away from coherent security sector reform, critics say.
Danab and the squeeze on international support
The Danab force was the centerpiece of Western hopes for a capable Somali strike force. Trained by US and partner advisers, the unit showed capability in select operations against Al-Shabaab. But training programs cost money and political capital; allegations of corruption and mismanagement have prompted foreign partners to reassess their involvement.
When international training and logistical support wavers, the costs are immediate: fewer precision strikes, diminished intelligence-sharing and lower morale among Somali troops. That opens a second-order effect — groups on the margins, including elders and regional leaders, may feel forced to arm and organize local defense forces, perpetuating a cycle of fragmentation.
Local communities bear the burden
For people on the ground in Galmudug and other central regions, the strategic arguments mean little compared with the day-to-day realities of displacement, fear and loss. Residents reported fleeing as towns changed hands, markets and schools shuttered, and family breadwinners among the casualty lists. The human cost is the kind that does not always show up in official tallies but shapes the long-term prospects for recovery.
“The towns we lost were places where people had started rebuilding after years of conflict,” said a teacher who fled El Dheer. “When the fighting returns, it takes everything — hope, livelihoods, the chance you might have had.”
What does this mean for Somalia and beyond?
The Cowsweyne story is both local and universal. It is a cautionary tale about how a single military setback can cascade into institutional unraveling when governance is weak and external support inconsistent. Across the Sahel, the Levant and parts of West Africa, similar dynamics have played out: insurgent advances followed by fragmented responses, the rise of local militias, and a struggle over who represents the state.
- Will Somalia find a path to reconstruct a national army that is professional, accountable and resilient?
- Can international partners calibrate support so that it strengthens institutions rather than fuels dependency or patronage?
- And perhaps most pressing: how can political leaders balance urgent security needs with the long-term task of building inclusive governance that reduces the appeal of extremists?
Those questions have no easy answers. Yet they are the ones that will determine whether Cowsweyne remains a wake-up call or becomes a milestone on a road to deeper fragmentation. For now, the human toll — families displaced, towns lost and an army struggling to reorganize — is a reminder that rebuilding a state after decades of conflict takes coherent strategy, political consensus and, above all, sustained investment in accountable security institutions.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.
