Somalia and Ethiopia’s foreign ministers meet in Addis Ababa to deepen ties

Somalia and Ethiopia test a fragile thaw on the shores of Lake Tana

At a security forum in northern Ethiopia this weekend, officials from Somalia and Ethiopia stepped into a quiet side room and did something deceptively simple: they talked. In an era when silence can harden into policy, the meeting on the sidelines of the Tana High-Level Forum in Bahir Dar—Ethiopia’s lakeside city ringed by papyrus boats and monastic islands—signaled a cautious shift from confrontation to engagement in the Horn of Africa.

The delegations, led by Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ali Mohamed Omar, and Ethiopia’s foreign minister, met to explore how two uneasy neighbors might begin to repair a relationship battered by a year of diplomatic crisis. The focus, both sides indicated, is practical: counterterrorism, regional stability, and the future of the African Union’s new Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), the follow-on to the AU’s transitional mission as Somalia reclaims security responsibilities.

It was a quiet conversation in a noisy neighborhood. The Horn of Africa is contending with layered shocks—political strife, armed groups, droughts and floods, and Red Sea disruptions ricocheting into already strained economies. Any signal that friction might give way to coordination matters, particularly between two countries whose fates are so firmly intertwined by geography, commerce, and a common security threat in al-Shabaab.

Why now?

Timing matters here. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was in Ethiopia just over a week earlier, a visible step in a months-long effort to restore normal channels after relations plunged in early 2024. At the heart of the rupture was Ethiopia’s controversial maritime memorandum of understanding with North Western State of Somalia, the self-declared republic that declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but lacks international recognition.

The deal, announced on New Year’s Day, envisioned giving landlocked Ethiopia a pathway to the Red Sea via North Western State of Somalia’s coast and, by some accounts, hinted at possible Ethiopian moves toward recognizing North Western State of Somalia’s statehood. Somalia saw that as a direct challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity and severed ties. Over the months that followed, amid mediation by regional partners and the African Union, the two sides agreed to restore diplomatic representation—triage for a diplomatic hemorrhage.

The Bahir Dar meeting extends that repair job. It also comes as both governments face urgent domestic priorities: Somalia is pressing ahead with reforms and a security transition at home; Ethiopia is grappling with economic headwinds and internal conflicts. Cooperation, even limited, can lower the temperature and free each to tackle problems closer to home.

The deal that detonated the freeze

Ethiopia’s motive for the North Western State of Somalia deal is no mystery. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, the country of more than 120 million has had no coastline. About 95 percent of its trade moves through Djibouti, a lifeline but also an expensive bottleneck for a fast-growing, import-dependent economy. Ethiopia’s leaders have repeatedly framed sea access as a strategic necessity. For Somalia, whose 3,300-kilometer coastline is the longest in mainland Africa, the MoU was less a policy paper than a line in the sand. Mogadishu views any port deal concluded with North Western State of Somalia without federal consent as an affront to national sovereignty.

Somalia’s position is rooted not just in law but in memory. The country is still stitching itself together after decades of conflict and fragmentation. The political project underway in Mogadishu—completing a constitution, restructuring security forces, preparing for one-person-one-vote elections—cannot coexist with a precedent that effectively sidelines the federal government on maritime matters. That tension hasn’t disappeared; it is simply back in the negotiating room.

Security first: AUSSOM and the al-Shabaab puzzle

Both delegations emphasized security cooperation, a reminder that, for all the nationalist rhetoric of the past year, the two countries share a problem set. Al-Shabaab remains resilient despite pressure, and the group has exploited cross-border vulnerabilities in the past. Ethiopia, which maintains a significant security stake along its eastern frontier and has contributed troops to previous AU missions in Somalia, cannot afford a rupture that makes intelligence-sharing more difficult.

The handoff from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia to AUSSOM is another reason both sides are talking. AUSSOM is designed to support Somali forces with targeted, non-combat assistance as they take the lead on security. Its effectiveness will depend on the political weather: less thunder, more coordination. Without a working relationship between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, support risks becoming an acronym in search of traction.

A meeting that matters—but not a breakthrough

These are green shoots, not a harvest. A single meeting by Lake Tana does not resolve Ethiopia’s search for a diversified port strategy or Somalia’s determination to assert authority over its territory, including North Western State of Somalia. It doesn’t answer whether Addis Ababa is prepared to recalibrate or clarify the terms of its MoU in a way Mogadishu can live with. And it doesn’t address North Western State of Somalia’s own red lines or the role of Gulf investors who have poured money into regional ports—from Berbera to Doraleh—reshaping the geopolitics of the shoreline.

Yet, there are reasons for cautious optimism. The Horn’s recent history shows that pragmatic needs often bring rivals back to the table sooner than expected. Cross-border markets don’t stop for political feuds; pastoralist communities trace their migrations across lines on a map that mean far less in the open range. Traders along the Jijiga–Hargeisa corridor will tell you that cargo finds a way. The question is whether states can build policy around those realities rather than against them.

What to watch

• Clarity on the maritime MoU: Will Ethiopia seek to formalize any port access through a framework acceptable to Somalia’s federal government? Language and legal contours will matter.
• Security mechanics: Look for signs of renewed intelligence-sharing, cross-border hotlines, or joint patrol protocols to counter al-Shabaab infiltration.
• AUSSOM’s design: The AU’s final mandate, funding streams, and timelines will reveal how much regional consensus there is on Somalia’s security transition.
• Diplomatic signaling: Restored embassies are a start. Consular activity, resumed flights, and mixed technical committees on trade and border management would indicate a deeper thaw.

Global stakes on a narrow strait

The Horn’s politics don’t stay local. Disruptions in the Red Sea—where attacks have diverted shipping routes and raised insurance costs—have already rippled through African economies. Stability along the Somali and Ethiopian corridor influences not just security but the cost of food and fuel for millions across East Africa. Meanwhile, a scramble for port influence by regional powers is reshaping alignments from Djibouti to Berbera to Lamu. Against that backdrop, Somalia and Ethiopia talking is not a footnote; it’s a variable in a wider equation.

There’s a Somali proverb often quoted at moments like this: “Peace is expensive, but it buys everything.” The price here may be political capital—managing domestic constituencies, finessing wording, and absorbing the bruises that come with compromise. The payoff, if they can reach it, is a more predictable neighborhood where the fight against extremists is coordinated, trade routes are diversified and transparent, and the constitutional questions that have haunted the region are addressed at a table, not on a battlefield.

In Bahir Dar, where the Blue Nile makes its way toward a larger river, diplomats left their meeting with polite readouts and no grand declarations. That is often how real progress begins in this part of the world: slowly, with careful steps taken away from the edge. The next weeks will show whether those steps can become a path.

What would a fair port arrangement look like in a region crowded with powerful interests? Can Somalia protect its sovereignty while opening a door to the regional integration it needs? Can Ethiopia secure reliable sea access without burning bridges it still needs to cross? The answers will shape not only the contours of a bilateral relationship but the stability of a vital corner of Africa.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.