Neither Direct Nor Indirect Elections Can Legitimize Somalia Amid Structural Manipulation

Somalia’s elections show the model isn’t the problem — integrity is

For a decade, Somalia’s reform debate has framed elections as a technical puzzle: if indirect voting disappoints, move to direct elections; if elites pick delegates, expand to one-person, one-vote. The country’s recent experience — from the 2016/17 and 2021/22 indirect contests to Mogadishu’s December 2025 local elections — points to a harder truth. When rules are bent, institutions are captured and state resources are weaponized, neither indirect nor direct elections can produce consent or legitimacy.

What the indirect cycles really taught

Somalia’s 2016/17 indirect elections were a step up from the tightly restricted 2012 process. Using a structured electoral college, 135 elders selected 51 delegates for each seat — 14,025 Somalis took part — culminating in the Feb. 8, 2017 election of President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo.” The 2021/22 cycle more than doubled participation to 27,775 delegates, with 101 voting in each of the 275 House of the People seats, and produced the May 15, 2022 election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Yet broader participation did not fix a deeper problem: institutional integrity. The Federal Indirect Electoral Implementation Team (FIEIT), the State-level Indirect Electoral Implementation Teams (SIEITs) and the Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanism were designed to be neutral. In practice, their composition reflected political bargaining, not independence. Observers noted opaque vetting, constrained competition — sometimes to a single viable candidate — and selective enforcement of rules. Clan-based exclusions locked out aspirants; courts and complaints processes rarely offered redress.

Money and coercion compounded those flaws. During 2016/17, candidates were widely reported to have used cash to sway delegates, with former Auditor General Nur Jimale Farah publicly citing payments in the tens of thousands of dollars per vote and two highly contested seats costing successful candidates roughly $1.3 million each. Across both cycles, intimidation, travel restrictions and threats shadowed voting. When the administrators of an election are beholden to power, outcomes look managed by design — and disputes, often dismissed on technicalities or ignored, only harden that view.

State neutrality proved elusive

Neutrality — the bedrock of credible contests — seldom held. Government vehicles, fuel, security escorts and public funds were routinely reported in service of favored candidates. Permits, venues and accreditation became levers to tilt the field. Security forces were seen less as impartial guarantors than as instruments of pressure. Elections under such conditions can declare winners, but they struggle to confer authority that citizens recognize as legitimate.

Somalia moves to direct elections — without the guardrails

With the promise of fixing these deficits, Somalia enacted three laws to transition to direct voting: the Electoral Law, the Political Parties Law and the statute establishing the National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (NIEBC). Together they introduced one-person, one-vote, a formal multiparty system and a new electoral management body.

The speed and the staffing raised red flags. Parliament received the Electoral and Political Parties bills on Nov. 6, 2024 and passed them — along with presidential assent — in under three weeks, compressing scrutiny and consultation on measures that rewire the political system. The NIEBC commissioners were appointed unilaterally by authorities, without input from opposition parties or civil society, fueling the perception that the referee was an extension of the executive.

Mogadishu’s December 2025 local elections: a milestone, but what kind?

On Dec. 25, 2025, Mogadishu held local elections billed as historic. Of reportedly more than 900,000 registered voters, 233,314 cast ballots to elect 390 district councilors across 16 districts. Turnout and participation matter — and if voting expands to 50-plus districts across south-central Somalia, those numbers will grow — but legal compliance and even-handed administration matter more.

Here, the record is troubling. Articles 18 and 22 of the Electoral Law require simultaneous district council elections nationwide and provide for the 97-member Mogadishu City Council. In the capital, councilors were elected but the mayoral and deputy posts were excluded, and the Capital City Council vote was postponed without parliamentary amendment, straying from the law’s text. When the commission can deviate from statute in the capital, the standard becomes flexibility, not fidelity.

Other safeguards slipped. Article 27 mandates voluntary voter registration; media reports and video evidence alleged forced or cross-district enrollments. In June 2025, NIEBC Chair Abdikarim Ahmed Hassan rejected the claims as false and said registration was strictly voluntary. Article 34 requires publishing preliminary voter lists two months before election day and final lists 30 days prior; neither publication occurred. Article 42 calls for candidate lists at least 120 days in advance, yet submissions were accepted in less than 30 days. Article 47 bans use of public resources for campaigns and guarantees equal access to state media; the Justice and Solidarity Party was widely reported to have benefited from state resources.

Participation was also narrowed by boycott. Of 61 registered political associations, only 20 took part, with many citing systemic manipulation, selective application of the law and unequal access to state platforms. Transparency gaps deepened mistrust: the 2025 national budget did not earmark funds for election implementation and allocated about $1,536,840 to the electoral commission — largely for salaries and administration — even as election operations typically cost millions. The government has not disclosed how implementation was financed, leaving a basic question unanswered: Who paid for one-person, one-vote in Mogadishu?

The core lesson: structure matters less than stewardship

Direct elections are not inherently democratic. Nor are indirect elections inherently illegitimate. In Somalia, both models have been weakened by the same pattern: captured institutions, selective legality, abuse of public resources and ineffective oversight. When those conditions prevail, direct voting can legitimize predetermined outcomes, and indirect processes can be instruments of exclusion. The choice of model cannot compensate for the absence of integrity.

What credible elections would require

Somalia’s path to legitimate representation runs through institutional independence and enforced rules. Practical steps include:

• An appointment process for the electoral commission that requires cross-party, civil society and regional consent, with public vetting and fixed, protected terms.
• Transparent, audited election financing, with all domestic and external contributions published in real time and capped spending to curb vote-buying.
• Strict adherence to legal timelines: publish voter rolls on schedule, finalize candidate lists within statutory windows and release polling-station results by form and location.
• Enforce bans on using public resources in campaigns; guarantee equal access to state media and sanction violations promptly.
• Independent, accessible dispute resolution with clear deadlines, low filing barriers and binding, public decisions.
• Security forces trained and mandated to act as neutral protectors, not political actors, with independent monitoring of their conduct.
• Measures to lower participation costs and protect women and less-resourced candidates, countering entrenched gatekeeping.

These are not cosmetic fixes. They are the conditions without which any electoral model — indirect or direct — will keep generating authority without consent and participation without real choice. Somalia has shown it can expand the franchise. Now it must prove it can protect it.

By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.