Analysis: US army kills key chief of Islamic State in Africa

Saturday, January 28, 2023

BY CALEB WEISS & RYAN O’FARRELL

Map of Islamic State Somalia presence in Puntland (map by Ryan O’Farrell)

The United States introduced yesterday that it carried out a Special Forces (SOF) raid on a hideout for the Islamic State department in Somalia. During the raid, SOF troops killed Bilal al-Sudani, a key chief of Islamic State operations throughout a lot of japanese, central and southern Africa.

This kind of raid is a uncommon prevalence in Somalia, the place the united states primarily conducts drone strikes against Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s department in East Africa. That the U.S. put boots on the floor in an Islamic State stronghold to goal Sudani reveals how vital the terrorist was to the Islamic State and U.S. efforts to defeat the group.

In a press launch, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin says notified “on January 25, under orders from the President, the US military conducted a strike operation in northern Somalia that resulted in the death of a number of ISIS members, including Bilal-al-Sudani, an ISIS leader in Somalia and a key facilitator of ISIS global network.”

Secretary Austin went on to say that Sudani was “responsible for promoting the growing presence of ISIS in Africa and for funding the group’s operations worldwide, including in Afghanistan.” Sudani, a Sudanese countrywide who was former member of Shabaabthe place killed along with another 10 Sudanese members of the Islamic State’s neighborhood Somali wing.

The announcement follows a number of reviews in Somali media that describe a US drone strike against Islamic State-Somalia (ISS) militants. inside the Iskushuban region of ​​the Cal Miskaad Mountains in Somalia’s northern semi-autonomous location of Puntland. The mountain vary, which spans a lot of northern Puntland, has been a hideout for the ISS since its inception in late October 2015.

The US declaration failed to specify precisely the place in Puntland Sudani was killed. But reviews from The New York Times confirms that Sudani was killed in a cave complex throughout the Cal Miskaad Mountains, matching preceding Somali reviews. US SOF troops have been deployed close to the compound through helicopters and supposed to seize Sudani alive, even though an intense firefight resulted inside the demise of the terrorist chief.

Much of the ISS management is believed to be founded close to Galgala, a locality southwest of the coastal city of Bosaso on the border with Puntland and claimed territory of Northern Somalia (a self-governing location claiming independence from Somalia).

That stated, a lot of the ISS operational things to do in Puntland are rather close to the cities of Turmasaale and Balidhidin, each in Puntland’s Iskushuban district southeast of Bosaso deep inside the mountains (see map beneath).

Map of Islamic State Somalia presence in Puntland (map by Ryan O’Farrell)

Earlier this month, for instance, the ISS raided a Puntland security post near Balidhidinand killed at the very least one police officer. Although the ISS commander accountable for the raid –an Ethiopian citizen – was additionally killed inside the assault, this raid marked a uncommon main operation for the neighborhood Islamic State department.

The group had beforehand briefly seized Balidhidin in August 2021{one of the} group’s first main captures of a town because the assault on the northern coastal city of Qandala on the conclusion of 2016.

Although it carries out occasional assassinations or IED assaults, specially in Mogadishu, the ISS isn’t as operationally succesful as its rival, al-Qaeda’s Shabaab. Instead, its real risk lies in its coordination and facilitation of Islamic State affairs throughout a lot of Africa (and past).

The outsized position of the Islamic State of Somalia inside the world community

The Islamic State’s Somalia wing, led by former Shabaab commander Abdulqadir Mu’min, additionally hosts the Islamic State’s Al-Karrar regional workplace. Al-Karrar is accountable for appearing because the coordinating hub for all Islamic State affairs inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, South Africa and the networks between them, suggesting that it’s now additionally coordinating properly past Africa.

Before his demise, al-Sudani was believed to play a key position in, and even lead, the Al-Karrar workplace. US officers converse to The New York Times made this clear and said:

“There was no one else in the Islamic State’s global constellation of operatives who rivaled Mr. al-Sudani in his ability to receive and distribute illicit funds—as much as hundreds of thousands of dollars at any given time—to distant ISIS members on at least three continents through a network of secret contacts he built up over more than a decade.”

This description of Sudani matches UN reporting on Al-Karrar. The United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, citing member states, supplied this most detailed explanation to date of Al-Karrar’s major position inside the Islamic State’s regional monetary equipment, which has been a key node inside the group’s regional reorganization since 2018.

Under intense military pressure from the United States and its local allies in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State central apparatus faced significant resource constraints, a sharp decline from the group’s stature as one of the most resource-rich terrorist organizations in modern history.

This led the Islamic State to direct its affiliates to pursue financial self-sufficiency, which is structured under several regional “workplaces” that coordinate income generation and money laundering between affiliates and networks within certain regions, rather than money flowing from Iraq and Syria to Islamic State affiliates worldwide.

With counterparties in West Africa, South Asia, Syria and elsewhere, the ISS Al-Karrar office oversees significant fundraising operations through extortion and criminal activity in Somalia and South Africa.

Al-Karrar too monitors the networks which then transferred this money to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in eastern Congo and Al-Shabaab in Mozambique (not to be confused with al-Qaeda’s Shabaab in Somalia), both of which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in early and mid-2019, respectively .

According to info from Kivu security trackera clash monitoring task, ADF violence in japanese Congo has multiplied sharply because the first documented transfer of funds from the Islamic State in November 2017. While the group was accountable for solely 61 civilian deaths in 2017, 2020 this had increased to 782, reaching 1275 by 2021.

This cash has additionally allowed the ADF to convert itself right into a greater regional terrorist actor. Since summer time 2021, ADF has has been responsible for urban bombing, together with suicide bombings and different foiled plots, in Congo, Uganda and Rwanda. It is solely by using the Islamic State’s cash, with the assist of Sudani and the Al-Karrar workplace, that these operations might be carried out.

Similarly, the establishment of regional Islamic State financial networks linking Somalia and Mozambique, facilitated by Sudani and the Al-Karrar office, correlates with major gains from the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Mozambique. For example, the first documented financial transfer by the Islamic State (receipts reviewed by the authors) was to Mozambique in October 2019.

This was only a few months earlier than a series of offensives by Al-Shabaab in Mozambique in early 2020, which led to the seize of significant territory by that summer time, together with the most important cities captured by all Islamic State associates worldwide since 2017.

To be clear, overseas interventions beginning inside the summer time of 2021 have since then rolled back much of the group’s territoryeven though Al-Shabaab (or formally the Islamic State Mozambique Province since May 2022) has succeeded swing back towards an uprising and even increase its region of ​​operation.

Al-Karrar additionally oversaw the motion of tactical advisers to the Islamic State in Congo and Mozambique and the manufacturing of propaganda by each communities. These advisors have reportedly instructed the Islamic State in the Congo on the use of droneswhilst a member of the ISS reportedly traveled to the group in Mozambique in early 2020.

Media output from each communities, which matches to the Islamic State’s central media equipment through the Al-Karrar workplace, has additionally sharply escalated because the Islamic State’s propaganda equipment has shifted focus to Africa.

According to the UN, Al-Karrar too recently started to facilitate financing to the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan. This additionally appears to be confirmed by the United States, as Secretary Austin noted Sudanis role in sending money to Afghanistan.

Al-Karrar’s increased role in the Islamic State’s global apparatus beyond Africa may indicate the Islamic State’s confidence in the regional office’s ability to generate and launder money. If so, this speaks to the important role Sudani and his office played for the Islamic State more broadly.

Al-Sudani’s death is thus a major blow to the Islamic State’s global network and especially to its operations across large parts of central, eastern and southern Africa. His absence affects the group’s ability to effectively channel money, personnel and materiel to Islamic State operatives in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, South Africa and beyond.