To dive into the recent history of the Central African Republic means to immerse yourself in a maquis where several predators rule and where many international actors operate. A look back at decades of crisis.
Since the fall of Bokasa in 1979, Central Africa has experienced more than four decades of security peace. After several attempts, General Bozizé seized power in Bangui on March 15, 2003, overthrowing Ange-Félix Patassé. In the northern and eastern parts of the country, an uprising increases and a first gathering of political-military groups, the Union of Democratic Forces for the Rally (UFDR) is formed under the leadership of Michel Djotodia. Since the 1990s, the state’s decline has been generalized and there is almost no service in these regions. Between 2004 and 2008, a first civil war will cause many deaths and several thousand displaced people in the country. It will end with an uncertain peace and the signing of an agreement in Libreville, but will solve nothing in substance. In August 2012, a number of organizations gathered again to form Seleka (“Alliance” in Sango, the national language).
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When created, Seleka is powerful on paper. Numerically stronger (between 10,000 and 20,000 men in 2013 according to estimates) and better armed than the 4,000 to 7,000 members of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). But she is very undisciplined and disorganized. Tensions with the central power grew very quickly and despite an attempt at a government with national unity, a new conflict broke out where Seleka took power by force in Bangui in March 2013. Most major cities in the country fall under its control.
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Politically, Seleka wants to be a couple state structure and establish a parallel administration. The predator of natural resources and various taxes constitute its main income. Michel Djotodia officially became president on March 24, 2013. But Seleka became unmanageable and committed many abuses. Djotodia officially dissolved it on 13 September 2013 and was then forced to resign on 10 January 2014 and give way to a national transitional council led by Catherine Samba-Panza.
The weakness of the security forces has long encouraged village communities to create self-defense groups, anti-balaka. Mainly Christians and animists included the originally Muslim elements in their ranks and attacked the compartments de route, the Fulani nomad pastors or, in the southeast, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). When Seleka seized power in Bangui, anti-balaka from the Bossangoa region (Bozizé stronghold) mobilized and attacked their elements. Poorly armed and poorly supervised, they are characterized by their mysterious faith. They will find support and material reinforcement thanks to contributions from the forces that remained loyal to the former president. On December 5, 2013, during a coordinated operation, they stormed the capital where they settled permanently. Politically, the movement is divided into two mobiles: the Mokomet wing, the Ngaïssona wing, named after two anti-Balaka leaders near François Bozizé.
The reign of the predator
Since the departure of Michel Djotodia and the return to a semblance of constitutional order in Bangui, ex-Seleka troops have left the capital, but large inland cities are still under their control. The Alliance’s original groups are still very active and new organizations are being reconstituted or formed (FPRC, UPC, 3R). Anti-balaka are found mainly in Bangui, where they control entire neighborhoods, and in the west and southwest of the country, where they have seized many goods and shops from Muslim civilians, often forcing them to leave. go.
Many anti-balaka groups are also found in the southeastern part. Across the country, armed groups established laws, taxes and ransoms under the guise of “protecting” societies. At the end of January 2015 in Nairobi, an agreement was reached between various armed groups with a view to ending the crisis. But this agreement, which is being discussed in the absence of the transitional government, is being rejected by the international community. Nevertheless, several armed groups of ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka signatories will then ally depending on the circumstances.
A non-denominational war
Raised by many international media, the denominational origins of the Central African conflict are in fact just the consequence. Muslims have traditionally been at the forefront of the country’s economic activity. Their goods and companies arouse envy. In addition, since the arrival of Seleka – with a predominantly Muslim component – hate speech has been poured into the media, making the Muslim population a force for this alliance. Very quickly, anti-balaka will attack Muslim goods and businesses directly. These hate speeches will continue, especially in the southeastern part of the country where, especially in Bangassouthey will be the basis for serious mass crimes against Muslim populations in 2017.
A country dependent on the international community
Since 2014, hundreds of NGOs, the UN institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, the European Union, but also many bilateral partners, have flocked to the bed of the Central African Republic. But everything must be rebuilt. Gradually, democratic life resumed with the adoption of a new constitution in 2016 and the election of Faustin-Archange Touadéra as head of the country. Despite episodes of great violence, the state also finds its traces inland. Russia is gaining a foothold on the diplomatic stage and signing a military cooperation agreement with the government, although the deployment of Russian “private instructors” is controversial. In February 2019, a peace agreement is signed between representatives of 14 armed groups and the government of Bangui, paving the way for a period of relative stability. But the country is still fragile. The presidential and team election in December 2020 is a test.
A new coalition at the gates of Bangui
While the vote is due to take place on December 27, six armed groups from ex-Seleka and the two anti-Balaka movements are publishing a document signed on December 15, noting the “obvious failure” of the peace agreement. . Two days later, the same groups in a declaration (this unsigned) announced a merger of their six groups into a single entity, The Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). They decide to go to Bangui. Clashes take place. In addition to Minusca, Rwandan and Russian reinforcements arrived to counter the insurgency’s progress.
François Bozizé or the eternal pursuit of power
Official spokesman for his party, KNK, denies any involvement in the creation of CPC. But everything in his career suggests that former President Bozizé will spare no effort to return to power. The former general of Bokassa, who became putsch president in 2003, was elected in 2005 and 2011, before he himself was deposed by Seleka in 2013. In exile in Uganda, he retains control of his party, KNK, once almighty. He will return nicely in 2019 and announce his candidacy for the presidential election. But this was rejected by the Constitutional Court due to an international arrest warrant weighing him since 2014 and UN sanctions. KNK announced shortly after they supported the opposition candidate Anicet-Georges Dologuélé. But many suspect him of playing a double game and behind the creation of CPC.
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