Somalia at Risk: Demagogues and Their Threat to National Unity
Editorial Verdict: Somalia at a Crossroads — Demagoguery, Patronage and the Fraying of Federalism
Three and a half years into a four‑year term, critics of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud argue that the promise of a renewed Somalia — one that could finally suppress Al‑Shabaab, rebuild institutions and knit together fractious clans — has been replaced by a politics of personalization. What began as hopeful restoration has, they say, slid toward centralisation, clientelism and the politicisation of security and aid. The result, according to opponents and a growing chorus of civil society voices, is a government that governs through fear rather than consensus.
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The accusations in plain language
Opposition figures and editorial voices have accused the federal government of using state institutions as instruments of domination. They point to what they describe as the sidelining of parliament, the coercive use of security forces against federal member states and a steady stream of controversial appointments they say reward loyalty over competence. One high‑profile example cited repeatedly in public discourse is the recent appointment of Maryan Ali Abuukar as Deputy Minister of Family Affairs and Human Rights — an appointment criticised by some as evidence of nepotism because of her family ties to a prominent senator from Jubaland.
“When offices become coins to spend, you lose the language of service,” said an opposition lawmaker in Mogadishu who requested anonymity. “The danger is not just corruption. It’s that the state loses the ability to mediate disputes and provide basic security.”
Voices from the streets and the camps
In Mogadishu’s tea‑stalls and the dusty camps outside Baidoa, people describe a different anxiety: persistent insecurity, rising costs and the sense that national resources fail to reach ordinary lives. A humanitarian worker in Beledweyne told me that donors are increasingly frustrated by the impression that aid can be redirected for political ends. “We are trying to keep clinics open and get food to children,” she said. “When aid is instrumentalised, donors pull back, and the most vulnerable suffer.”
For many Somalis, the most immediate threat remains Al‑Shabaab. Analysts warn that political fragmentation at the centre — and the erosion of trust between Mogadishu and the regions — undermines coordinated military and civic responses. UN and NGO sources have documented ongoing attacks and large-scale displacement in several regions, though the fight against the militant group has produced both successes and setbacks in recent years.
How institutions have been weakened
Federal systems survive on a delicate balance: enough central authority to manage national defence and external relations, enough local autonomy to reflect clan identities and regional priorities. Critics say that balance has been disturbed in Somalia. They point to a pattern of appointments and decrees that have bypassed consultative processes and sidelined parliamentary oversight.
“You can centralise power quickly when institutions are young,” an academic specialising in Horn of Africa politics observed. “But it’s costly. If parliament and independent institutions can be muzzled, the consequence is governance by decree and a narrower set of interests controlling the state.”
Corruption perceptions are a persistent problem for fragile states; international organisations have long warned that when public funds are channelled into patronage networks, public services and security operations both suffer. In Somalia’s case, some federal member states complain of being starved of resources at precisely the moment they need strengthened security and humanitarian capacity.
Security, aid and the regional ripple effects
The politics inside Mogadishu cannot be disentangled from regional dynamics. The Horn of Africa is a strategic theatre: trade, migration and security pressures cross borders. A Somalia perceived as unstable creates broader risks — from refugee flows to opportunities for transnational extremist networks. International partners have been pragmatic, balancing aid and military assistance with pressure for reforms. But donor fatigue is real, and perceptions of misuse can accelerate retrenchment.
Somalia’s challenges also resemble a global pattern: in fledgling democracies, populist leaders often centralise power by invoking security threats and sidelining checks and balances. This playbook can deliver short‑term control, but it risks long‑term fragility.
What does this mean for ordinary Somalis?
At a market in Kismayo, a shopkeeper named Abdi (who asked that his full name not be used) summed up a sentiment I heard repeatedly: “We don’t care for who wins arguments in parliament. We want the roads fixed, the schools open, and our children safe.” For many citizens, the debate among elites over federalism and loyalty feels remote from daily survival.
If government actions indeed erode trust between clans and regions, the stakes are not just political but existential. Somalia’s social fabric — interwoven with customary law, clan networks and urban civic life — can withstand strain, but only up to a point.
Questions for the road ahead
As Somalia edges toward the final year of the current presidential term, several questions cannot be avoided: Can federal institutions be rebuilt and insulated from partisan capture? Will security policy be depoliticised so it serves national, not factional, ends? Can the international community sustain engagement without enabling clientelist rule?
The answers will shape not just Mogadishu’s skyline but the livelihoods of millions and the security of a region long familiar with volatility. Healing will require not only political compromise at the top but renewed investments in transparent institutions, independent media and the everyday services that signal the state’s value to its people.
Somalia’s path forward will demand more than slogans. It will require leaders who choose the hard work of building trust over the temptations of short‑term domination. If they fail, the country risks slipping from fragile recovery into deeper fragmentation — with consequences that will be felt far beyond its borders.
By Ali Musa
Axadle Times international–Monitoring.